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AN ANALYSIS OF 
LEADERSHIP AMONG 
ONE-TERM PRESIDENTS 
 
The study of the presidency would appear to be relatively simple.  The sample population 
is relatively small, their performance is, for the most part, recorded and like the weather, 
it seems everyone has opinions about them.  In reviewing current literature discussing 
presidential greatness, most historians and political scientists have generally looked to 
answer two questions: 1) Who were our greatest, and; 2) How should all be rank ordered?   
For the last 65+ years, presidential polls have been the main vehicle used to answer these 
questions.  In doing so, researchers have generally reached out to the public and asked 
them to rank order the presidents from greatest to worst.  The results at the top and 
bottom of these surveys have been relatively consistent.  While the specific order may 
vary, Abraham Lincoln, George Washington and Franklin Delano Roosevelt are 
generally viewed as the best; with the likes of James Buchanan, Andrew Johnson and 
Warren Harding at or near the bottom of the rankings.   
As for the rest, they usually fit into one of four categories -- the near great, the average, 
the below average, or failures, with the one-term presidents who failed to be reelected 
normally being rated in the lower categories.  This would seem to make sense, because 
they are often viewed as failed presidents.  However, as surprising as it may seem, of the 
43 men who have served as President of the United States, only fourteen were reelected 
and went on to serve past their initial term. Ten were defeated in their bid for a second 
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term.  Five failed in their attempt to win their party’s nomination to run for reelection and 
seven opted not to run for reelection.  Additionally, five of the seven who died while in 
office, died during their first term and were not afforded the opportunity to run for a 
second term.  It does not appear that any scholarly work has been done to collectively 
look at this group who make up a full third of the presidential population.  This represents 
a sizable gap in political thinking to be rectified. 
 
         William D. Blake, Ph.D., Chair 
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Introduction 
On 21 January, 2014 James A. Baker, Secretary of State during the George H. W. Bush 
presidency, made the bold statement in a speech at the celebration in honor of the 25th 
anniversary of Bush’s inauguration that “George Bush was the best one-term President in 
the history of the United States” (Baker, 2014).  His comment lead to considerable dialog 
and head nodding in agreement from a most partisan audience.  In fairness to Secretary 
Baker, his comment was a good personal appraisal of his friend’s time in office, but was 
it correct?  And, if so, how would one know? 
 
The initial question for consideration would appear to be a simple one, namely, “Who 
was the best one-term President in the history of the United States?”  However, in 
attempting to answer that seemingly simple question, a significant number of issues arise.  
For instance, what is greatness in the context of a one-term President, and what are the 
dimensions of “greatness” that should be considered in answering this question?  Other 
difficult and somewhat subjective issues arise, such as, is it possible to be great, but 
simply not appreciated?  Also, were those that were not reelected really that terrible, or 
were they simply unlucky in the timing of their administrations?  These questions all beg 
for answers.  However, in looking at how to answer these questions, it appears one of the 
main characteristics mentioned in almost every study of the presidency is presidential 
leadership and the use of power.  This paper will specifically address the leadership 
dimensions by which presidents have been evaluated and analyze how presidents, in 
general have performed against them, and specifically how one-term presidents fared.   
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In reviewing current literature discussing presidential greatness, most historians and 
political scientists have generally looked to answer two questions: 1) Who were our 
greatest, and; 2) How should all be rank ordered?   For the last 65+ years, presidential 
polls have been the main vehicle used to answer these questions.  In developing their 
theories, researchers have generally reached out to the public and asked them to rank 
order the presidents from greatest to worst.  The results at the top and bottom of these 
surveys have been relatively consistent.  While the specific order may vary, Lincoln, 
Washington and Franklin Delano Roosevelt are generally viewed as the best; with the 
likes of Buchanan, Andrew Johnson and Harding near or at the bottom of the rankings.   
 
As for the rest, they usually fit neatly into one of four categories -- the near great, the 
average, the below average, or failures, with the one-term presidents normally being rated 
in the lower categories.  This would seem to make sense, because they are often viewed 
as failed presidents.  It does not appear that any scholarly work has been done to 
collectively look at this specific group, which is significant because they make up over a 
third of the total presidential population.  This represents a sizable gap in political 
thinking to be rectified and this thesis will do so.  
 
One might ask, “Why is presidential leadership even important, when we have three 
branches of government sharing the government’s responsibilities?  The answer is easy, 
they don’t share responsibility, rather they provide balance, and keep each other in check, 
and someone has to be “in charge.”  And, as Nancy Kassebaum indicated, leadership on 
the national scene must and can only emanate from the Oval Office.  Those who serve in 
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Congress cannot provide national leadership, because they must “meet the constituent 
interest against the national interests” (Kassebaum, 1979: 241).  This research is 
important because, not only will it specifically address the leadership and use of power 
by a specific group of presidents, it will add to a body of knowledge which is significant 
for a society of which Michael Genevieve has noted, "Students today are a-historical: 
they know virtually nothing about any president who came before George Bush" 
(Genovese, 2000: ix).   
 
As surprising as it may seem, of the 43 men who have served as President of the United 
States, only fourteen were reelected and went on to serve past their initial term. Ten were 
defeated in their bid for a second term.  Five failed in their attempt to win their party’s 
nomination to run for reelection and seven opted not to run for reelection.  Additionally, 
five of the seven who died while in office, died during their first term and were not 
afforded the opportunity to run for a second term.  
 
A one-term president for purposes of this study is defined as one who either failed in his 
attempt for reelection, or failed to receive his party’s nomination to run for reelection.  To 
date, fifteen have fallen into this category.  They will serve as the initial sample 
population for this research.  Listed in the order they served, they are: 
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President   Term(s) of Office Reason for Leaving Office  
     
John Adams    1797-1801       Failed in Reelection Bid  
John Q. Adams   1825-1829       Failed in Reelection Bid  
Martin Van Buren   1837-1841       Failed in Reelection Bid  
John Tyler    1841-1845       Failed to be Renominated 
Millard Fillmore   1850-1853        Failed to be Renominated 
Franklin Pierce   1853-1857        Failed to be Renominated 
Andrew Johnson   1865-1869       Failed to be Renominated  
Chester A. Arthur   1881-1885       Failed to be Renominated 
Grover Cleveland   1885-1889, 1893-1897*  Subsequently Reelected 
Benjamin Harrison   1889-1893       Failed in Reelection Bid  
William Howard Taft   1909-1913       Failed in Reelection Bid  
Herbert Hoover   1929-1933       Failed in Reelection Bid  
Gerald Ford    1974-1976       Failed in Reelection Bid  
Jimmy Carter    1977-1981       Failed in Reelection Bid  
George H.W. Bush   1989-1993       Failed in Reelection Bid  
 
*Grover Cleveland technically qualifies as a one-term president because he was defeated by 
Benjamin Harrison when he ran President after his first term; however, four years later he 
defeated Harrison, becoming both the 22nd and 24th President of the United States.  As such, he 
will not be considered part of this population for this analysis. 
 
The study of the presidency is unique in many ways.  First, the sample size is very small 
and the conditions they served under vary greatly from peace to war, economic stability 
to depression and during periods of isolationism to being the unquestioned leader of the 
free world.  In each administration the challenges were unique and different.  
Additionally, for the most part, the study of presidents has been mostly anecdotal in 
nature and failed to use the types of quantitative measures that are now so prevalent in the 
social studies.   This research will analyze the issues from both a quantitative and 
qualitative view using the results of polls and surveys, presidential leadership studies and 
historical reviews as the primary resources to gauge presidential success and greatness.  
Acknowledging that while all three are excellent resources and of great interest, each has 
shortcomings.  But when taken together, they offer unique insights into the qualities and 
traits that have made some presidents stand out from the rest.  
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For the most part, polls and surveys solicit feedback on that vague quality of “greatness” 
whereas leadership studies focus specifically on how the presidents led and used their 
presidential powers.  Historical reviews help put the results of polls and leadership 
analysis in context with the times.  It is unclear when considering presidents if greatness 
and leadership are synonymous and whether the greatest presidents were also the best 
leaders.  This paper will argue that leadership and the attributes it encompasses are the 
most important presidential characteristics in determining greatness and in doing so, 
places special emphasis on analyzing the sample population through the more focused 
lens of how they led.  This paper will: 1)  review the sample population and how they 
have been rated an ranked by experts in the political science, legal, and historical arenas; 
2) review the most significant challenges they faced as president, and: 3) analyze how 
they fare when analyzed in light of the most current thoughts on presidential leadership.   
 
The last point is most significant if only because presidential leadership, as is all of 
leadership, is difficult to define.  While many resources have been reviewed as part of 
this research, three presidential studies stand out among them and appear to be the most 
relevant.  The final portion of this thesis will review and analyze the presidents being 
discussed based on how they used their presidential powers and leadership skills in the 
context of the theories presented in the following presidential studies:  “Presidential 
Power and the Modern Presidents,” by  Richard E. Neustadt; “The Strategic President, 
Persuasion & Opportunity in Presidential Leadership,” by George Edwards, and: “The 
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Politics President Make, Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton,”  by Stephen 
Skowronek. 
 
While a major portion of this research analyzes the sample population using the theories 
previously identified, they are not the only presidential theories that abound.  Bruce 
Kuklick, argues that presidential success is not truly about leadership, but rather how the 
president is perceived, and that the presidents we judge as being the most successful are 
those who skillfully manipulated the emotions of the populace (Kuklick: 1988).   
 
Likewise, C. Don Livingston, took a different tact from the norm, indicating that most 
recent presidential leadership dialog focusses on the human and institutional aspects of 
the presidency, but don’t pay sufficient attention to the presidential environment, namely 
the effects of mass communications and how they have diminished our view of the 
president’s leadership propensity and productivity by denying him flexibility to maneuver 
and operate (Livingston, 1984: 53).   Whereas Kuklick may in fact be correct in his 
observations concerning perception versus concrete achievements being the way we 
measure presidents, and Livingston articulating that modern presidents now have less 
room to maneuver behind the scenes in order to do the country’s biddings, we must have 
a method to measure the leadership and accomplishments of our presidents.  Therefore, 
this research will primarily utilize the theories and methods of Nuestadt, Edwards and 
Skowronek as its base line.   
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These three noted political scientists have taken different and unique approaches in their 
analysis of presidential power and leadership.  Interestingly enough, if one is to follow 
their dialog on presidential leadership, it appears to be a successful president, one needs 
to be a good “clerk”, but also have the power to persuade (Nuestadt); or needs to be an 
able “facilitator” (Edwards) or, simply be lucky based on the timing of his presidency 
(Skowronek and to an extent, historian Arthur Schlesinger, Sr.).  While the theories cited 
are considerably more detailed than the summaries just provided, they encompass many 
different aspects concerning the use of presidential power and those factors will be an 
integral element of this report.  
 
The first issue to be resolved would seem to be the easiest, namely, “what is leadership?”  
Per Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, leadership has a number of definitions 
to include:  “the quality of a leader …capacity to lead … is that degree ingredient of 
personality which causes men to follow ….is the successful resolution of problems,” 
(Gove ed. 1993:1283).  However, even with a “standard” definition, such as above, the 
concept of leadership is at best nebulous and hard to definitively describe.  Neustadt 
indicates, “we like to “rate’ a President.  We like to measure him as ‘weak’ or ‘strong’ 
and call what we are measuring his “leadership’’’ (Neustadt, 1980:3).  Theodore Lowi 
observed, “Because we expect more from our presidents than they are capable of 
delivering, the potential for presidential failure is exacerbated” (Lowi, 1985).  Given 
those dynamics, how can presidents be successful leaders?  For the purposes of this 
analysis, we will follow the lead of Justice Potter Stewart and the analogy he used when 
discussing a case in front of the Supreme Court.  He said the specific subject under 
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consideration “was hard to define, but that I know it when I see it” (Jabobellis v. Ohio, 
378 U.S. 184 (1964)).  As this research is further developed, specific criteria for 
leadership and the attributes that define it will be developed, and we will know it when 
we see it. To do this, the use of expert polls and survey results will provide the initial 
means to reduce the initial sample population to a more realistic and manageable element 
that can be further reviewed through detailed analysis of their time in office and how they 
used their presidential powers.     
 
While a number of resources will be utilized and analyzed in this research, the ultimate 
goal is relatively simple, namely to determine who was the greatest one-term president.  
And in the eyes of the American people the criteria for success is relatively simple, they 
want a president in the White House who can get the job done (Cronin, 1980: 43).  In 
determining who that person is, and how well they did in “getting the job done,” this 
research looks to identify the president who exuded confidence, showed himself to be 
both competent and capable, able to work with the power elites both inside and outside of 
Washington, and did so in a way that he clearly set the agenda, was in charge and got the 
job done.  While it is clear that both opportunity and competence affect a president's 
historical standing, this research will identify the president who got the job done best.  
Using the criteria that great leadership defines presidential greatness, this report will 
address a number of significant issues concerning Presidential performance and 
leadership and will answer the questions, “What are the factors that should be utilized to 
provide a consistent way to evaluate presidential success and who was the greatest one-
term President in U.S. history?”   
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Chapter One  
Greatness Among  
One-Term Presidents 
How Other Have Seen Them 
 
The leadership exhibited by the 14 one-term presidents will initially be analyzed using 
their overall rankings and trends in their ratings from expert and scholarly polls and the 
leadership dimension ratings identified in the 2000 and 2009 C-SPAN  Historian’s 
Survey of Presidential Leadership.   
 
Polls and Surveys:  It seems that with the nearly monthly release of polling results 
informing the general public of how our presidents rate from best to worst, it would be 
relatively simple to answer the questions previously outlined. However, if anything, 
many of these simply muddy the water.  Although consistently showing the same 
individuals at either the top or bottom of the rankings, the results are far from analytical 
and often appear extremely subjective.  This portion of the report will outline the history, 
“accuracy” and utility of Presidential Ranking Polls through a review of a significant 
number of polls with special emphasis on the following: 
 
The Schlesinger Polls:  In 1948 Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., a noted American historian, 
began what has become an American ritual when he asked 55 experts, the majority of 
whom were historians, to evaluate each president on his “performance in office” and 
place them into one of five categories: Great, Near Great, Average, Below Average and 
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Failure.  The “standard” was not to be their lifetime achievements, but rather their 
performance during their time in the White House.  Believing the scholars could 
recognize greatness or failure, they were left to decide for themselves how presidential 
performance was to be judged.  He conducted a second survey a number of years later 
(1962) , and his son, a no less eminent historian, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. conducted a third 
survey (1996).  Although precedent setting, and excellent sources of data, these polls 
were not without issues. In reviewing the results of his and his father’s polls in a Political 
Science Quarterly article, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. went to great lengths to discount the 
problems caused by the subjectivity of the polls but then similarly discounted more 
scientific approaches as having not enough or too many variables and being difficult or 
intimidating for those being surveyed.  He further identified that regardless of the 
method, the results came out remarkably similar (Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., 1997: 179) 
and that there were problems with the respondents establishing their own criteria and 
often not following the minimal guidance they received.  Additionally, difficulties arose 
evaluating Presidents such as Ford and Kennedy because of the brevity of their time in 
office and with Presidents such as Nixon, Lyndon Johnson and George H.W. Bush 
because their foreign and domestic records were so dissimilar (Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr., 
1997:183).  Also, many respondents were reluctant to confine their judgments to White 
House performance. However, at least at the top and bottom of the polls, with few 
exceptions, there was a high level of consistency in their rankings.  The results of how the 
fourteen one-term presidents placed overall in the Schlesinger surveys are as follows:  
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President         Schlesinger Sr.     Schlesinger Sr.     Schlesinger Jr.     Change in Rankings* 
       1948      1962          1996   From 1948-1996 
   
John Adams      9          10                  11   +2 
John Q. Adams       11          13                  18   +7 
Martin Van Buren   15          17                  21   +6 
William H. Taft      16   16                  22        +6 
Chester A. Arthur   17          21                  26   +9 
Andrew Johnson    19         23                  37   +18** 
Herbert Hoover      20      19                  35   +15 
Benjamin Harrison   21         20                  19   -2 
John Tyler    22         25                  32   +10 
Millard Fillmore    24         26                  31   +7 
Franklin Pierce      27        28                  33   +6 
Gerald R. Ford      --   --      28 
Jimmy Carter    --   --      27 
George H. W. Bush   --   --      24 
 
Total # of Presidents  
        in survey   29   31      39 
 
*Changes in rankings are based on the differences between the first (1948) and third (1966) polls 
and must also be considered in light of the changes in the size of the evaluated population which 
increased from 29 to 31 to 39.  Note also that a + indicates a higher numerical ranking which 
actually indicates a negative trend in that they went down in the polls.  The only one in our 
sample population whose ranking indicated a -, or favorable move, was Benjamin Harrison who 
went from 21 to 20 to 19 in the three polls.  
** Largest negative change between the 1st and 3rd Schlesinger poll.  
 
It is significant to note that all but one of the one-term presidents (Harrison), placed lower 
in subsequent polls than they did in the initial 1948 poll. Others, such as Andrew 
Johnson, Herbert Hoover and John Tyler did not stand the test of time well and fell 
considerably in the rankings.  It should also be noted, that due to their dates in office, 
three of the presidents in the sample population (Ford, Carter and George H.W. Bush) 
were only considered in the third Schlesinger survey which precluded the opportunity to 
see trends that may have occurred as their administrations were viewed over time and 
from different perspectives.  This is significant in light of the positive resurgence of 
presidents such as Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower, and that the “presidencies of 
James Madison, John Adams, and John Q. Adams are no longer as highly regarded as 
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they used to be”  (Lindgren, 2000: 2).  Concerns over these issues will be somewhat 
rectified later in this review.       
 
Public Opinion Polls:  In the years since the Schlesingers initiated this ritual, public 
opinion polls and surveys have become somewhat of a cottage industry.  Regretfully, 
these types of polls often lack rigor, direct questions to the general public rather than an 
informed group, are not scientific in nature and generally deal with generic questions 
such as:  “Who do you think was the greatest American President?” or “Who do you 
regard as the greatest United States President?”  The results in these types of polls are 
questionable, at best, for at least two reasons: 1) No standard criteria for “greatness” is 
provided and, 2) In asking the question of the general public, there is no guarantee the 
respondents are versed enough to make informed responses.  Polls of this nature are of 
interest, but to be discounted because they too often appear to be little more than 
popularity contests, versus expert evaluations and therefore will not be considered in this 
analysis.   
 
Expert/Scholarly Polls:  Probably the best group of individuals to rank order the 
presidents would be a group of former presidents; however, to date only one has 
publically done so, that being Harry Truman who in 1953 named his eight best presidents 
-- in chronological order, Washington, Jefferson, Jackson, Polk, Lincoln, Grover 
Cleveland, Wilson and FDR – and his eight worst – Zachary Taylor, Franklin Pierce, 
James Buchanan, Ulysses S. Grant, Benjamin Harrison, Warren G. Harding and 
Eisenhower (Schlesinger, 1997: 181).  Once again, like the study of presidents, a very 
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small sample size of “respondents” and some have noted that Truman may have used this 
in part to sling arrows at his successor, Eisenhower, who had been in office less than two 
years when Truman provided his ratings.  However, the Schlesingers, in their evaluations 
and in a small number of later polls, limited respondents to a number of “experts,” in 
areas such as history and political scientist, and at least in one case legal experts, which 
ensured respondents were, if not experts, at least relatively well versed on the population 
being considered.  However, even when gathering experts, issues have been noted.  
Nichols, identified a number of problems with polls of this nature, the biggest being that 
expert presidential ranking polls are simply “not very rigorous” and are fraught with 
subjectivity, context and bias issues (Nichols, 2012: 277).  He also raised concerns over 
the lack of a specific criterion for success in the evaluation of presidential leadership, 
asking the question, what must a president do, or how must he act to be considered great?  
Among his concerns were that: there seems to be no rules, set criteria or consistency used 
regarding when and how the surveys are done and most of the surveys appear subjective 
in nature allowing the scholar or institution to use their own criteria to evaluate and; 
secondly, it is unclear how the polls put differing administrations into appropriate 
historical perspective.  In essence, “how can you fairly treat presidents who faced 
different historical opportunities and problems? Are the polls biased?”  In addressing this 
concern, the usual cited threat has been the contention of a “predominance of Democratic 
partisan preference within most sample surveys.” Nichols additionally noted the 
possibility “that expert presidential ranking polls are not independent of one another” and 
that too often it appears the same experts are taking part in multiple surveys (Nichols, 
2012: 277-278).  Therefore, the respondents’ potential biases may be reflected and the 
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polls and surveys become more about those doing the surveys than the population being 
evaluated.   
 
In conducting the research for this project, two additional issues surfaced which must also 
be taken into account.  As indicated by Arthur Schlesinger Jr., evaluations often look to 
be made outside of the established parameters with presidents often appearing to be 
evaluated based on the “whole man” versus simply their time in office, and secondly, 
changes to evaluations based on later criteria and the passage of time from when 
Presidents left office, allow their result to be influenced by later historian’s evaluations.  
Situational dependent, this could be a positive, such in the cases of Eisenhower and 
Truman, or a negative as it has shown to be with Andrew Jackson, Herbert Hoover and 
more recently Woodrow Wilson..    
 
Without question, polls and surveys have considerable shortfalls; however, they also have 
great utility.  They represent the opinions of a specific population at a certain time, and 
that is relevant.  Additionally, while indicating that the polls appear to be biased and 
subjective, when they have an informed group taking them, it may be that rather than 
being subjective, the respondents are simply more knowledgeable.  Using this 
philosophy, some relatively recent surveys appear to have minimized many of the 
shortcomings identified.  
 
The “October 2000 Wall Street Journal Survey of Scholars in History, Politics and Law,” 
along with James Lindgren’s analysis as outlined in his article, “Rating the Presidents of 
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the United States, 1789-2000:  A Survey of Scholars in History, Political Science, and 
Law,” and the 2000 and 2009 C-Span Historians’ Survey of Presidential Leadership 
overcame, or at least minimized, many of the shortfalls of earlier surveys.  They were 
done with exceptionally qualified respondents and significantly more specificity than 
previous similar projects.  Following is a detailed discussion of the surveys. 
 
The October 2000 The Wall Street Journal Survey of Scholars in History, Politics and 
Law:  In his articles about his and his father’s polls, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. went to great 
lengths to defend their polls against allegations that they were biased, left wing oriented 
and rewarded those with more progressive agendas (Schlesinger, 1997: 180).  While 
these allegations continue to plague many more recent surveys, in preparing the book 
“Presidential Leadership Rating the Best and the Worst in the White House,” the editors 
went to great lengths to rectify that situation.  They used the most politically unbiased 
criteria and selective group of respondents to that time.  Their study reported the results 
from a survey of 78 “scholars on the presidency,” which surveyed experts on presidential 
history and politics from the fields of law and political science as well as historians.  
They balanced the group to be surveyed with approximately equal numbers of experts on 
the left and on the right in order to have the most politically unbiased perspectives on 
presidential reputations possible (Taranto, and Leo, eds. 2004). 
 
With a major goal of presenting the opinion of experts controlling for political 
orientation, they attempted to resolve the conflict between prior rankings of presidents 
that were either done by liberal scholars or conservative scholars, but not by both.  Expert 
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panels of scholars in each field (law, political science and history) developed a list of 
experts in their fields to take the surveys.  The 78 respondents (a 59% response rate) 
consisted of 30 historians, 25 political scientists and 23 law professors.  In the final 
report, they additionally included numerous comments provided by the respondents to 
clarify responses. 
 
The scholars were asked to “Please rate each President using the table below.  In deciding 
how to rate a president, please take into consideration the value of the accomplishments 
of his presidency and the leadership he provided the nation, along with any other criteria 
you deem appropriate.” 
PRESIDENT        HIGHLY          ABOVE  AVERAGE BELOW              WELL BELOW 
          SUPERIOR       AVERAGE        AVERAGE          AVERAGE 
 
They were further asked to “Please identify the five most over-rated or under-rated 
Presidents of the United States, indicating whether they are overrated or underrated.”  
While none of the one-term presidents made the over-rated listing, both Hoover and 
Carter made the under-rated list.  
 
In attempting to identify predictors of high presidential ratings, Lindgren did not find a 
statistical relationship between the ages or political party of a president and his mean 
ratings by scholars.  In other words, neither age nor affiliation at the time of election had 
any measurable effect on measured presidential success (Lindgren, 2000:16-17). 
However, while not specifically addressing one-term presidents who failed in their bid 
for reelection, Lindgren did note an apparent bias against one-term presidents and that 
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“presidents who served less than one full term rated about a half a point lower (-.45) than 
those who served just one full term.  On the other hand, presidents who served parts of 
two terms (or more) rated nearly a full point higher (.95) than presidents who served just 
one term (Lindgren 2000:16-19).  The results for our sample population are below: 
 
Ranking of Presidents by Mean Score 
               Mean    Median Std. Dev.  
Great -- None in our sample  
Near Great – None in our sample 
Above Average 
13 John Adams    3.36  3  .80  
 
Average 
19 William Howard Taft   3.00  3  .66 
20 John Quincy Adams    2.93  3  .76 
21 George H.W. Bush    2.92  3  .68 
23 Martin Van Buren    2.77  3  .61 
26 Chester Arthur    2.71  3  .56 
 
Below Average  
27 Benjamin Harrison    2.62  3  .54 
28 Gerald Ford    2.59  3  .61 
29 Herbert Hoover    2.53  3  .87 
30 Jimmy Carter    2.47  3  .75 
34 John Tyler     2.03  3  .72 
35 Millard Fillmore    1.91  3  .74 
 
Failure 
36 Andrew Johnson    1.65  3  .81 
37T Franklin Pierce    1.58  3  .68 
39 James Buchanan    1.33  3  .62 
 
These appear to be among the first surveys of their type, using quantifiable measurements 
and a consistent response and scoring system, as well as a balanced, knowledgeable 
group of respondents.  However, as good as they are, a set of complimentary surveys, the 
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2000 and 2009 C-SPAN Historians Survey of Presidential Leadership, have proven to be 
even more comprehensive.  In conducting those surveys, C-SPAN asked presidential 
historians to rank order the 42 former occupants of the White House based on the ten 
specific attributes of leadership listed below: 
 Public persuasion 
 Crisis leadership 
 Economic management   
 Moral authority 
 International relations 
 Administrative skills 
 Relations with Congress 
 Vision/setting the agenda 
 Pursuit of equal justice for all 
 Performance within (the) context of their time 
 
In evaluating their results, “C-SPAN’s academic advisors developed a survey in which 
participants used one (“not effective”) to ten (“very effective”) to rate each president on 
ten qualities of presidential leadership … (as listed above) …Surveys were distributed to 
147 historians (65 responded) and other professional observers of the presidency, drawn 
from a database of C-SPAN’s programming, augmented by suggestions from academic 
advisors.  Participants were guaranteed that individual survey results remain confidential.   
Survey results were tabulated by averaging all responses in a given category for each 
president.  Each of the categories was given equal weighting in the total scores” (C-
SPAN, 2000 and 2009).  In compiling their results, they were thus able to show not only 
who was ranked the highest, but also how each was rated in each of the categories.   
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Our sample population, listed in the order of how they were ranked overall in the polls, 
versus all presidents, is as follows: 
President       2000 Ranking   2009 Ranking  (+/-) 
        
John Adams          16    (598)             17     (545)                   -53 
George H.W. Bush         20    (548)                        18     (542)              -6 
John Q. Adams         19    (564)   19     (542)              -24 
Gerald Ford           23    (495)                        22     (509)    +14 
William Howard Taft        24    (491)                        24     (485)   -6 
Jimmy Carter          22    (518) *                      25     (474) *              -44 
Benjamin Harrison         31    (426)              30     (442)   +16 
Martin Van Buren         30    (429)                        31     (435)   +6 
Chester A. Arthur        32    (423)              32     (420)   -3 
Herbert Hoover         34    (400)                        34     (389)   -11 
John Tyler          36    (369)                        35     (372)   +3 
Millard Fillmore        35    (395)   37     (351)              -44 
Franklin Pierce        39    (286)             40     (287)              +1 
Andrew Johnson         41    (280)             42     (258)  -22 
 
() Indicates cumulative numerical score based on the 10 leadership attributes. 
+/- Reflects their overall numerical score change from 2000 to 2009. 
*Based on their scores, there appears to be a natural break line between President Carter and President 
Harrison in both ranking and numerical scores. 
 
These are the most thorough and specific surveys to date and the population surveyed is 
comparable to that of the 2000 Wall Street Journal survey for balance.  Additionally, 
because they used a consistent criterion, it enables the reader, or analyst to follow trends 
and better observe how presidents have been viewed over time.  While still somewhat 
subjective in nature, they have a large enough sample size that there is some level of 
strength in aggregation.  The traits used in these surveys, will be the attributes this report 
utilizes to further define those we will look for in measuring presidential leadership. 
Acknowledging these appear to be the best, or at least most reliable results, they are not 
without issues.  By providing ten specific attributes for consideration, they provide a 
level of specificity in defining that vague term “leadership.” However, they are all 
weighted the same in the final computation.  It would seem that some traits would be 
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more indicative of presidential leadership than others.  For example, while 
acknowledging that “Administration” was identified by Woodrow Wilson, when he was a 
young professor at Princeton, as a key element in the discipline of political science, it is 
doubtful it should be given the same weight as Crisis Management and Economic 
Management.  It would have been relatively simple to have prioritized and/or weighted 
the variables.  However, at this stage, the numbers have been computed and you “have 
what you have,” and therefore these are the figures we will work with.  Based on their 
results, a review of the “top” one-term presidents is as follows:  
President      2009        2000 2009    2000    Net Score  
      Rank*       Rank  Score      Score  Change  
  
J. Adams   17 (1)          16 (1) 545     598  -53  
G.H.W. Bush    18 (2)          20 (3) 542     548  -6 
J.Q. Adams       19 (3)          19 (2) 542     564  -22 
Ford    22 (4)          23 (5)  509     495  +14  
Taft     24 (5)         24 (6) 485     491  -6 
Carter    25 (6)          22 (4) 474     518  -44** 
 
*The first number indicates their ranking against all presidents.  The number inside the () 
indicates ranking among one-term presidents.  
** In reviewing all 14 of the sample population, a natural break in their scores appears 
immediately after President Carter.  (See page 19.) 
 
Adams again received the highest rating among one-term presidents; however, the trend 
identified earlier by Lindgren concerning Adam’s presidency being held not as highly as 
previously continues (Lindgren, 2000: 1).  Meanwhile, Bush continues his upward trend 
as it appears his time in office is receiving somewhat of a relook similar to those that 
Eisenhower and Truman have received in recent years.  In the two C-SPAN surveys, John 
Adams was ranked highest among one-term president with George H.W. Bush ranked 
third in the 2000 survey and 50 aggregate points lower than Adams and then moving up 
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to second and only 3 points (less than .3 of one percent) behind Adams in the later 
survey.   
 
While concern over the weighting of the different variables has already been addressed, 
two additional “issues” concerning President Bush need to also be raised.  Bush received 
a very low rating, a full 15 points lower than Adams’s rating in the category 
“Vision/Setting the Agenda.”  His score in this area, especially so soon after his 
presidency, may have been based not so much on a lack of vision, but more on an off the 
record comment he made. 
 
In a Time Magazine article, “Where is the Real George Bush?” Robert Ajemian made 
reference to a conversation Bush had with a friend concerning laying out an agenda for 
his administration and Bush commented, “Oh, the vision thing” (Ajemian, 1987: 20).  
Bush’s comment was quickly picked up by the press and political commentators and used 
against him by his political opponents.  In looking at the situation a bit more holistically, 
one does well to remember that Bush was following a charismatic president into office, 
one who Bush had served as Vice President under and that he had been actively involved 
with in establishing the nation’s priorities and policies for the previous eight years.  
Additionally, his predecessor (Reagan), is one who is often included in the group of 
presidents identified as “near great” and in following him, Bush pursued many of the 
same policies and programs.  Probably better representations of Bush’s true thoughts and 
vision that did not get the same level of attention are the two identified below: 
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    “We don’t need radical new direction, we need strong leadership.  We need to 
remember who we are (Duffy and Goodgame, 1992: 22) , and  
 “… we’re coming in to build on a proud record that has already been established:  
(Bush, 1989). 
Secondly, it is generally acknowledged that among the key reasons Bush lost in his 
reelection bid was due to the state of the economy and in correcting it, he broke an 
earlier campaign promise to not raise taxes.  The United States had entered a mild 
recession, as compared to other post-war recessions in July 1990, and it lasted until 
roughly March 1991 (Gardner, 1994).  It was characterized by a sluggish employment 
recovery with unemployment continuing to rise through June 1992, even though overall 
economic growth had started the previous year (Smith, 2011).  Bush made the difficult 
decision to raise taxes in order to jump start the economy; however, in doing so he 
committed political suicide.  While the economy had begun to grow as the presidential 
campaign was conducted, the belated recovery from the 1991 recession contributed to 
Bill Clinton’s victory in the 1992 presidential election.  In his campaign, Clinton used 
the economy as a primary focus and between that, and the involvement of a third party 
candidate, Bush was not reelected, after having a near 90% approval rating the year 
before.  Clinton had the good fortune of having the economy rising and the recession end 
during the early days of his administration.  In the end, Clinton won praise for his 
economic leadership, and while Bush ranked 23d overall for Economic management, 
Clinton was ranked 3rd.   
 
Overall, the six highest rated one-term presidents in the major expert polls are as follows:     
23 
 
 
Schlesinger Sr.     
Schlesinger Sr.     
Schlesinger Jr.  
WSJ/Lindgren C-SPAN C-SPAN 
1948 1962 1996* 2000 2000 2009 
      
J. Adams (9) J. Adams (10) J. Adams (11) J. Adams (13) J. Adams (16) J. Adams (17)  
J.Q. Adams (11) J.Q. Adams (13) J.Q. Adams (18) Taft (19) J.Q. Adams (19) G.H.W. Bush (18)  
Van Buren (15) Taft (16) B. Harrison (19) J.Q. Adams (20)      G.H.W. Bush (20) J.Q. Adams (19) 
Taft (16) Van Buren (17) Van Buren (21) G.H.W. Bush (21)    Carter (22) Ford (22) 
Arthur (17) Harrison (20) Taft (22) Van Buren (23) Ford (23)  Taft (24) 
A. Johnson (19)  Arthur (21) Bush (24)  Arthur (26)  Van Buren (30) Carter (25)  
 ( ) Indicates their overall placement in the survey results.   
*First time Ford (28), Carter (27), and G.H.W. Bush (24) are considered in a Schlesinger  
Poll.  Their placing in the overall poll is identified within the ().  Among the one-term presidents,  
Bush was the only one who made the top six on that poll with Carter ranked 7th and Ford 8th.   
 
As shown in the results of the six expert surveys above, John Adams is routinely viewed 
the top one-term president.  This is further reinforced by his ranking on the two scholarly 
surveys referenced which ranked the presidents based on leadership attributes.  However, 
is he truly the greatest?  While he has been consistently at the top of the most credible 
polls and surveys, his overall placement in the expert and scholarly surveys has trended 
downwards.  Is this simply due to the passing of time?  Or possibly the more modern 24 
hour news and information cycle that makes anything not happening today, not relevant?  
Both explanations are plausible, but it is doubtful that either of these tells the full story. 
 
Rather, it possibly may be because those taking the surveys are knowledgeable historians 
and political scientists who are more closely scrutinizing his actual time in office.  Some, 
most notably Stephen Skowronek, have included Adams among a group, including 
Adam’s son, John Q. Adams and Jimmy Carter, as failed presidents (Skowronek, 1993, 
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7).  It is possible that Adams is no longer being advantaged by his accomplishments prior 
to his presidency? 
 
Meanwhile, Bush continues to move upward in the polls the longer he is out of office and 
his administration is looked at through a different lens.  On a statistical basis, most 
recently he trailed John Adams by far less than 1%, and with the gains he has made over 
the last few years, it is not difficult to envision him passing Adams in the near future.   
 
Earlier in this report I indicated, “The traits used in these surveys, will be the attributes 
utilized to further define those we will look for in measuring presidential leadership.”  
Therefore, based on the polls one would have to recognize John Adams as number one, 
with Bush a close number two.  As we continue to evaluate our presidents and their place 
in history, it is easy to predict that he may very well be recognized as “the greatest one-
term president in U.S. history,” at least from what the polls tell us in the not too distant 
future.  But is that all there is?  Is measuring leadership based solely on polls enough? 
In his narrative report outlining the results of his 1948 poll, Arthur Schlesinger Sr. 
indicated the six greatest presidents (Lincoln, Washington, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, 
Wilson, Jefferson and Jackson) were “lucky in their times.”  This paper will now review 
the six presidents who over the years have moved into the top positions among one-term 
presidents and see how “lucky they were in their times.” 
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Chapter Two 
Greatness Among One-Term Presidents 
A Review of Their Times 
 
By the conclusion of the first chapter of this report, the candidates for the best one-term 
president had been reduced from the original 14 to six using the results of the expert 
surveys as the criteria to measure their leadership traits and attributes.  While that avenue 
could probably be pursued a bit further, it is clear that a number of trends have been 
identified and the top six are generally becoming a relatively consistent group.  Now may 
be a good time to relook the results of the 2000 and 2009 C-Span Historians Survey of 
Presidential Leadership.    
President      2009 Ranking   2000 Ranking  (+/-) 
           
John Adams         17   (545)   16 (598)  -53 
George H.W. Bush            18   (542)   20    (548)  -6 
John Q. Adams        19   (542)   19     (564)   -24 
Gerald Ford          22   (509)   23      (495)   +14 
William Howard Taft       24   (485)   24      (491)  -6 
Jimmy Carter         25   (474)*  22       (518)*  -44 
 
Benjamin Harrison        30   (442)   31      (426)   +16 
Martin Van Buren        31   (435)   30       (429)  +6 
Chester A. Arthur       32   (420)   32       (423)   -3 
Herbert Hoover        34   (389)   34       (400)  -11 
John Tyler         35   (372)   36       (369)  +3 
Millard Fillmore       37   (351)   35       (395)   -44 
Franklin Pierce       40   (287)   39       (286)  +1 
Andrew Johnson        42   (258)   41 (280)  -22 
 
() Indicates cumulative numerical score based on the 10 leadership attributes.   
+/-Reflects the numerical score change from 2000 to 2009.  This, in part, shows how they are “trending.” 
 
For the remainder of this research, we will use the top six:  John Adams, George H.W. 
Bush, John Q. Adams, Gerald Ford, William Howard Taft, and Jimmy Carter, as our 
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revised sample population.  In doing so, and expanding on the research done in the first 
portion of this report we will be better able to answer the questions, “What are the factors 
that should be utilized to provide a consistent way to evaluate presidential success and 
who was the greatest one-term President in U.S. history?”  
 
Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. in his famous 1948 article, found a similar thread running through 
the administrations of all his survey deemed to be great.  He found that “It is in the 
administrations of these men that we can find a common pattern.  The greats were indeed 
lucky in “their times”: they are all identified with some crucial turning point in our 
nation’s history.  As our first president, Washington got the infant republic on its feet.  
Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase was our first territorial expansion, pushing back the 
western boundary from the Mississippi to the Rockies.  Jackson put down an attempt at 
secession on the part of South Carolina and acted to right the imbalance between the 
eastern moneyed interests and the Western and Southern farmers.  Lincoln preserved the 
Union through four years of bloody civil war.  Wilson’s “New Freedom” and Roosevelt’s 
“New Deal” introduced far reaching changes in the social and economic structure of the 
country and both men led the U.S. to intervene in world wars and the making of 
international peace.  All six by timely action achieved timeless results” (Schlesinger, Sr., 
1948: 68).  If this trend follows the six who have been “designated” as the greatest, does 
it follow that the trend would continue and that to be great, one must not only have the 
skills, but also the opportunity?  The question now to be answered, is not only were our 
six lucky in their times, but also “by timely actions achieve timeless results?”  This 
portion of the report will review the times and key events that occurred during the 
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administrations of the six one-term presidents and reflect on how they handled their 
leadership challenges and the situations that faced the United States.   
 
John Adams  
John Adams, one of our Nation's Founding Fathers, was our second President.   Harvard 
educated, he held a number of significant positions before, during and after the 
Revolutionary War and is generally viewed as a scholar, and intellectual.  However, to 
say that these attributes led to a successful presidency would be incorrect.  Not only faced 
with the daunting issues of running the country, he was faced with:   
 Affiliation and ties to a remarkable predecessor at a time when the political 
landscape both at home and abroad was dramatically changing and, neither he 
nor his party, were in synch with the changes. 
 A dynamic vice-president who not only was also the leader of the opposition, 
but also the leading agent for change in the government and in the way of 
government. 
 Internal strife and disloyalty within both his party and administration.    
As Washington's Vice President, Adams was the logical Federalist candidate for 
president in 1796 and he defeated Thomas Jefferson of the Democrat-Republican party.  
Under the rules in effect at the time, whoever received the most votes became the 
president with the runner up becoming the vice president.  Therefore, these two rivals 
were elected as a "team" – our nation’s first team of rivals.  Regretfully, their team was 
not a success.  
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Adams’ party, the Federalist, had in large part been formed by Alexander Hamilton.  
Washington had been a supporter of their programs and was Hamilton’s mentor dating 
back to the Revolutionary War days.  Hamilton was a dynamic leader and strategic 
thinker whose drive, initiatives and policy recommendations and subsequent 
implementations were critical in the founding days of our country.   He was the country’s 
first Secretary of Treasury and played a central role in the decision by the newly 
independent United States to assume the debts of its former colonies, a key step in 
constructing a sound monetary system and credit-worthy nation.  He virtually created the 
nation’s financial architecture from scratch (Rattner: 2015).  In carrying out this agenda, 
the Federalist Party advocated policies calling for a centralized government with a 
national bank, tariffs and relied on strong relations with Britain to improve trade 
opportunities.   
 
However, Adams’ foremost opponent, Jefferson, the vice president and leader of the 
opposition party, stood firmly against the Federalist policies.  Jefferson further believed 
the previously approved “Jay Treaty” which negotiated relations with England, and of 
which Adams had been a co-author, had been uneven and advantaged England.  Jefferson 
believed that the policies of the Federalists were outdated and pressed for change.  
However, Adams was encumbered by the policies of his predecessor and his party and 
continued to support them.  While faced with these challenges to his administration, 
Adams was also forced to spend much of his time as president engaged in actions to keep 
the United States out of war with France and working towards normalizing the strained 
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relations between the two countries.   As Adams exerted great effort to stay out of war, he 
was faced with increasing opposition to his actions concerning France by both parties.   
 
Regretfully, Adams’ personality did not help him during these trying times, and at times 
he was his own worst enemy.  Not noted for his tact, “Adams’s bluntness was not an 
asset to the new American nation at this time when the utmost diplomacy was needed 
everywhere” (Ambruster, 1966: 63).  It seemed that for a good part of his professional 
career he went out of his way to offend many of those from whom he needed, or would 
need, support.  During the Revolutionary War period, while in France working with 
Benjamin Franklin and John Jay, Adams was openly disdainful of Franklin’s work ethic 
and insubordinate.  It was noted that he had the “capacity for envy and jealously, even 
vanity… he did not feel secure.  A touchy man, rather than a sensitive one, he could not 
avoid showing his jealousy of Washington whom he looked upon as merely a military 
hero and thus inferior to the scholar” (Ambruster, 1966: 63-64).  These traits, and his 
overly aggressive behavior did not win him the support needed during his presidency.  
If that were not enough, when it appeared the U.S would possibly be going to war with 
France, he supported Congress’ passage of the Alien and Sedition Acts which consisted 
of four measures designed to limit immigration and free speech.  However, he then used 
these measures to respond to criticism against the government and more specifically 
against opposition within his own party, which completely eroded what little internal 
support he had.   
 
30 
 
These actions, exasperated the already tense relationship Adams had within the Federalist 
Party where his position was already tenuous at best.  Adams was only notionally the 
head of the Federalist Party with the true power being Alexander Hamilton.  Hamilton’s 
efforts and influence to the fledgling country were well known and although the 
Federalists made Adams their presidential candidate, it was based in large part on his on 
his national reputation and solely to ensure the defeat of Thomas Jefferson.  However, 
most in the party would have preferred Hamilton.  While Hamilton and his followers 
provided some level of support to Adams during the elections of 1796, they did so only 
because they considered him, as opposed to Jefferson, to be the lesser of two evils.  They 
believed Adams lacked the seriousness, and popularity that had caused Washington to be 
successful and feared Adams was too vain, opinionated, unpredictable and stubborn to 
follow their directions (Elkins and McKitrick, 1993: 513-537).  In that, they were right 
because Adams “was not shrewd enough to conceal ….. his ego” (Armbruster, 1966: 64).  
However, they believed that he was the strongest national candidate in their fight to 
defeat Jefferson.  In the end, the friction between Adams and Hamilton and his followers 
could not be overcome and ultimately led to Adams’ downfall.     
 
When elected in 1796, Adams retained Washington’s cabinet and continued the major 
programs of the Washington Administration.  In doing so, he acted to strengthen the 
central government, and continued the economic programs Hamilton had implemented, 
both of which were strategic mistakes, and subsequently cost him.  Neither of these were 
what the states or general population wanted, and by pursuing them, his presidential time 
was combative and led to his defeat four years later.  While Hamilton held no official 
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position during Adams’ administration, he regularly consulted with and advised key 
cabinet members, especially his successor, the Secretary of the Treasury.  While the 
retention of Washington’s cabinet by Adams ensured a level of continuity, the members 
remained too close to Hamilton and their mixed loyalties caused great friction with 
Adams.  Because of this, Adams often was forced to act independent of their advice, 
making decisions in spite of, or over their strong objections.   
 
Adams had been put in a near untenable situation and then exacerbated it through his own 
actions.  Stephen Skowronek best summed it up when he said, “The second president, 
was an affiliate of the first (president), and although he was skeptical of the course 
chartered during the Washington administration, Adams came to power dutifully 
affirming its policies and personnel.  Adams was not free to deal with his “inheritance” as 
he saw fit and take charge on his own terms.  In fact, the Hamiltonians he held over from 
Washington’s cabinet worked against his efforts to do just that, usurping in the process 
some of the most basic powers and turning his initial affirmation of continuity and 
stability into an impediment to his capacity to be a president at all.  By the time Adams 
was ready to purge Hamilton’s henchmen and stake out his own ground, he was all too 
deeply implicated in their controversial programs, and neither they nor their strongest 
opponents, the Jeffersonians, were prepared to credit the legitimacy of the new order he 
belatedly ventured to establish in his own right” (Skowronek, 193: 23).   
 
Against this backdrop, Hamilton actively sought to prevent Adams’ election and the 
bitterness between the two men became public knowledge in 1800 when Hamilton 
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denounced Adams in a letter that was published through the efforts of Jefferson’s 
Democratic-Republicans.    
 
In 1800 Adams was unsuccessful in his bid for reelection, being opposed not only by the 
Democratic-Republicans under Jefferson but also by an aggressive Hamilton, who “opted 
for the part of the spoiler in the election of 1800 and renounced …Adams.  Adams had 
betrayed Hamilton’s cause; he had scuttled the he party program and purged Hamilton’s 
friends from power.  Hamilton reckoned that if Federalism was to ever to regain its 
proper bearing, Adams would have to be defeated and he party rebuilt in opposition to a 
Jefferson presidency. If we must have an enemy at the head of the government,” he 
advised, “let it be one who we can oppose, and for whom we are not responsible, who 
will not involve our party in the disgrace of his foolish and bad measures”  (Skowronek, 
1993: 62).  
 
With the exception of keeping the United States out of a possible war with France, which 
Adams considered his crowning achievement and subsequently had memorialized on his 
tombstone, Adams’ administration for the most part was a disaster.  He had been a 
statesman, diplomat, and leading advocate of American independence from Great Britain; 
however, he did not fare well in his role as president.  Following an incredibly successful 
and revered president and continuing his policies even though they had lost the support of 
the majority of the population led to dissention from all sides.  His inability to keep his 
party and cabinet in check and their disloyalty wreaked havoc on his intended agenda.   
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Well educated, and an Enlightenment political theorist who promoted republicanism as 
well as a strong central government, he was one of only two Presidents that signed the 
Declaration of Independence.  It appears much of his fame and legacy came from his 
activities before and during the revolution, but not due to his time as president.  In fact, 
he was among a group of presidents “generally judged as politically incompetent” 
(Skowronek, 1993: 8). 
 
George H.W. Bush 
George Herbert Walker Bush served as the 41st President of the United States from 1989 
to 1993 and was the first vice president to be elected directly to the office of president 
since Martin Van Buren in 1837. However, much like Van Buren and John Adams, his 
good fortune in being elected directly from the vice presidency was tempered by 
comparisons to the incredibly successful presidents they followed into office 
(Washington, Jackson and Reagan).  In all three cases, their predecessors are now 
routinely ranked among the greats or near greats in most polls while Bush, Adams, and 
Van Buren failed to be reelected. 
 
A successful businessman, Bush had previously served in a number of key positions 
culminating with his duties as vice president under Ronald Reagan.  His resume is most 
impressive having served a congressman, ambassador, as well as the U.S Representative 
to China, Director of Central Intelligence, and Chairman of the Republican National 
Committee during the difficult Watergate period.  In 1989 Bush was nominated by the 
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Republican Party and ran against Democrat Michael Dukakis, winning 54% of the 
popular vote and 426 out of 537 electoral votes. 
 
For the most part, foreign policy drove the Bush presidency, with the Berlin Wall falling 
in 1989, followed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union two years later.  His greatest test 
and success came when Iraqi President Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, and then 
threatened to move into Saudi Arabia. Vowing to free Kuwait, Bush rallied the United 
Nations, the U. S. people, and Congress and sent 425,000 American troops to the Middle 
East where they were joined by 118,000 troops from allied nations. After weeks of air 
and missile bombardment, the 100-hour land battle called Desert Storm routed Iraq's 
million-man army.  He also sent American troops into Panama to overthrow the corrupt 
regime of General Manuel Noriega, who was threatening the security of the canal and the 
Americans living there. Noriega was subsequently brought to the United States for trial as 
a drug trafficker (WH Biography). 
 
However, Bush experienced difficulties domestically.  In his acceptance speech when 
nominated to run in 1988, he included a commitment to not raise taxes.  Later the 
economic situation changed dramatically.  Bush had inherited the deficits of the Reagan 
years and although by today’s standards, the numbers appear low, by 1990 the deficit had 
tripled from 1980 levels.  A fiscal conservative, Bush saw the need for action to reduce 
the deficit and ensure fiscal stability.  As a Republican president, working with a 
Democrat controlled Congress, he argued the best way to reduce the deficit would be 
through cuts to government spending, as opposed to the Democrats who sought to raise 
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taxes.  As the battle waged on, Bush was forced by the Democratic majority to 
compromise and support their efforts to increase tax revenues.  Although the economic 
situation had dramatically changed since his pledge, many Republican leaders felt 
betrayed because Bush had specifically promised "no new taxes."   
 
Republicans in Congress did not support the President, their party leader, and defeated a 
Bush proposal which would have enacted spending cuts and tax increases to reduce the 
deficit by $500 billion over five years. Subsequently, Bush was forced to accept the 
Democrats' demands for higher taxes (and more spending), which further alienated 
Republicans.  Shortly before this situation arose, Bush had been cited as having a record-
high approval rating of 89% (Gallup, 1992).  However, the budget and tax situation 
caused a splintering within the Republican Party and his approval rating, especially 
among Republicans, was damaged to a level from which it never recovered.   
 
However, he did have a number of major domestic successes.  During his administration 
much progress was seen with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
as well as one of the most pro-civil rights bills in decades.  He also oversaw greatly 
increased federal spending for education, childcare, and advanced technology research, 
and the approval and implementation of the Immigration Act of 1990, which led to a 40 
percent increase in legal immigration to the United States.  However, domestically he 
will probably always be more remembered for the economic difficulties which were 
exacerbated by his own party.  The economy was on the upswing as the presidential 
36 
 
campaign was conducted and the belated recovery contributed to Bill Clinton's victory in 
the 1992 presidential election.   
 
Bush was also faced with a situation similar to today’s Tea Party “revolution” within the 
Republican Party.  The radicalization of some segments of the far right portions of the 
party led by Pat Buchanan forced Bush, in an effort to maintain some level of party unity, 
to move further to the right on some issues and incorporate a number of socially 
conservative planks into the party platform. Once Bush had secured the nomination, in an 
effort to bring the party together and appease his detractors, he allowed Buchanan to give 
the keynote address at the Republican National Convention, and his “culture war” speech 
alienated many moderates within the party.  This served as a major distraction for Bush 
and forced him to spend considerable time and resources mending fences within the party 
over the next few months when he should have been campaigning based on his agenda.   
 
The public's concern over the federal budget deficit and fears of professional politicians 
also led to the independent candidacy of billionaire Texan Ross Perot, who was able to 
collect enough signatures to get his name on the ballot in all 50 states.  While not winning 
any states in the final election, he garnered over 19 million votes, the most ever by a third 
party candidate.  The consensus is that Perot’s running hurt Bush far worse than Clinton 
and in all likelihood if Perot had not run, the majority of his votes would have probably 
gone to Bush.  In an election where the two frontrunners were separated by 5 million 
votes, the 19 million cast for Perot were crucial losses for Bush.   
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In his campaign, Clinton used the state of the economy as his primary focus and between 
that, and the involvement of Perot, Bush was not reelected, after having had a near 90% 
approval rating the previous year.  Clinton had the good fortune of having the economy 
continue to rise and the recession end during the very early days of his administration.  
Post presidency Clinton is praised for his economic leadership, while Bush suffers by 
comparison.   
 
Was Bush a failed president?  Definitely not in the sense of Adams and some others in 
this report.  In fact, on the world stage, and especially in the areas of foreign policy, and 
as a wartime president, he did exceptionally well.  It has been noted that “The success of 
Operation Desert Storm was only possible because of the coalition assembled by George 
Bush – one unparalleled in world history and one that would not have supported the 
direct overthrow of Saddam Hussein…. (and) near the end of his term, the United States 
deployed, for the first time in history its armed forces for a large-scale humanitarian 
purposes in a foreign nation (Somalia) - but only after he had exhausted the alternatives 
and laid out the groundwork for a consensual policy (Edwards, 2009; 159-160). 
 
However, the economy did him in and while it is little remembered 20+ years later, 
beside for Clinton’s campaign rhetoric, his overall successes are long remembered.  
 
John Q. Adams  
If, in its early days, the United States had a “royal” family, it was definitely the Adams 
family.  “They …conducted themselves regally, governed disinterestedly and 
38 
 
demonstrated unalloyed patriotism” (Armbruster, 1966: 98).  If America has had a 
“crown prince” it was John Quincy Adams. “He served under Washington and with 
Lincoln; he lived with Benjamin Franklin, lunched with Lafayette, Jefferson and 
Wellington; he walked with Russia’s czars and talked with Britain’s king; he dined with 
Dickens, taught at Harvard, and was America minister to six European countries.  He 
negotiated the peace that ended the War of 1812, freed the African prisoners on the slave 
ship Amistad, served 16 years in the House of Representatives, restored free speech in 
Congress, led the antislavery movement…..and…. he was the sixth president of the 
United States.”  (Unger, 2012: 1).  However, like his father, he had a most unsuccessful 
presidency.   
 
With a background such as his and having accomplished so much before he ran for 
President, it would seem that he would have been incredibly successful as president.  
However, that was not to be.  In 1824 when he ran for President, he faced three major 
opponents: Andrew Jackson, William Crawford, and Henry Clay with each representing a 
different geographic region of the country.  Jackson, the war hero of the War of 1812, 
was the "man of the people" and had far greater support than the other candidates, 
winning 42% of the popular vote and 37% of the electoral vote, while Adams won only 
32% of both.  However, since no one received a majority, the election was sent to the 
House where each state would cast one vote for president.   Clay's personal dislike for 
Jackson and the similarities of his views and Adams’ on major issues such as tariffs and 
the need for internal improvements such as with roads and infrastructure, caused him to 
drop out and throw his support to Adams.  This led to Adams’ election by the House on 
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February 9, 1825, on the first ballot. Adams' victory shocked Jackson, who had received 
the most electoral and popular votes and fully expected to be president.  When Adams 
became president, he appointed Clay to be his Secretary of State. This forever tainted 
Adams’ term as President as opponents claimed that a "corrupt bargain" had been made 
between the two of them. Jackson subsequently dropped out of active politics for the next 
four years to work behind the scenes and do all possible to sabotage Adams’ efforts and 
secure his own victory in the next election.  
 
Domestically, Adams focused on "internal improvements," which consisted of actions 
such as high tariffs to support programs such as road--building, and the establishment of 
a national bank to encourage productive enterprise, as well as developing a national 
currency. Adams fought hard for modernization programs that included roads, canals, a 
national university, an astronomical observatory, and other initiatives; however, he had 
mixed results in large part due to opposition from Jackson's followers.  
 
Similarly on the international side, although generally regarded as one of the greatest 
diplomats in U.S history, Adams achieved little of long-term consequence in foreign 
affairs while president due to the opposition he faced in Congress, where his rivals 
generally prevented him from succeeding (Bennis, 1956, vol 1: 18-19). 
 
Nagel argues that his political skills were not any less than others of the day, and notes 
that having Henry Clay, one of the era's most astute politicians, as a principal advisor and 
supporter throughout his presidency was advantageous; however, Adams' political 
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problems were the result of an unusually hostile Jacksonian faction, and Adams' own 
dislike of the office  (Nagel, 1999).  Additionally, although a product of the political 
culture of his day, like his father before him, he refused to play politics according to the 
usual rules and was not aggressive in seeking out and garnering political support.    
 
Like his father, in so many ways, John Quincy Adams appears to be more noted for his 
time before and after serving as president.  One of our greatest diplomats, he drafted the 
Monroe Doctrine and a number of treaties while serving as representative to six different 
countries and as Secretary of State.  After his presidency, he was outspoken and 
adversarial especially on the issue of slavery.  Brilliant and astute, he articulated a theory 
whereby the president could abolish slavery by using his war powers correctly predicting 
Abraham Lincoln's use of the Emancipation Proclamation in 1863.  He also predicted the 
likelihood of the Union's dissolution over the slavery issue.  However, he was not able to 
overcome many of the obstacles he, and his political opponents, placed in front of him 
and showed little ability to either compromise or even coordinate.  His time as president 
was not a good time, and like his father, he has been “generally judged as politically 
incompetent” (Skowronek, 1993: 8). 
 
Gerald R. Ford  
It is difficult to imagine a president entering office under more challenging circumstances 
than Gerald Ford.  He became president after having been the vice president for barely 
eight months, replacing Spiro Agnew who resigned in disgrace.  He then assumed the 
presidency when Nixon resigned in the wake of the Watergate scandal making Gerald 
41 
 
Ford the only man to have ever held the offices of vice president and president, but not 
have been elected to either of them.  Ford was chosen as vice president, in large part, 
because of reputation for integrity and openness as well as his popularity in the Congress, 
and his moderate views.   
 
Untainted by Nixon’s activities, upon assuming the presidency, Ford had a short 
“honeymoon” and had the support of the American people and Congress.  However, a 
month after taking over the presidency, in an effort to calm the earlier controversies 
caused by the Nixon administration, Ford pardoned the former president.  Ford claimed 
he did it to save the nation from the prospect of a long, messy, and divisive trial.  This 
action was universally unpopular and it severely damaged Ford’s ability to lead and 
garner support for his agenda.  In an editorial, The New York Times stated that the Nixon 
pardon was "a profoundly unwise, divisive and unjust act" and with a stroke of the pen 
destroyed his "credibility as a man of judgment, candor and competence" (The New York 
Times. December 28, 2006).  On October 17, 1974, Ford testified before Congress on the 
pardon, making him the first sitting President to testify before Congress since Abraham 
Lincoln (Ford Testimony on Nixon Pardon - C-SPAN Video Library. C-spanvideo.org. 
October 17, 1974). 
 
Selecting his own cabinet, Ford worked to establish his own agenda during his first year 
in office, despite opposition from the heavily Democratic Congress.  In describing 
himself, Ford viewed himself as "a moderate in domestic affairs, a conservative in fiscal 
affairs, and a dyed-in-the-wool internationalist in foreign affairs" (WH Biographies).  
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Initially his top priority was to curb inflation; however, when the recession became the 
more serious issue, he shifted to measures aimed at stimulating the economy, while still 
working to combat inflation.  He vetoed a number of non-military appropriation bills that 
would have further increased the deficit, and subsequently vetoed 39 measures during his 
first 14 months in office (WH Biographies).  
 
While not as controversial as the Nixon pardon, President Ford offered clemency to those 
who evaded the draft during the Vietnam War if they would swear allegiance and 
perform two years of public service. Similarly, those who deserted during the war could 
return for two years in the branch they left to achieve clemency. Ford was criticized both 
by those who felt he was being too easy on the draft dodgers and those who had avoided 
the service because they felt they were in the right in their dissent.  
 
“In the foreign policy arena, he signed the Helsinki Accords, which symbolized a major 
step towards détente in the Cold War.  Additionally, he oversaw the final pullout of 
troops from Vietnam.  This happened as fighting continued and he was not able to get the 
previously approved funding from Congress to continue operations due to the unpopular 
nature of the war.  Subsequently, after United States involvement in the war for over 10 
years, the United States allowed Saigon to fall.  By 1976, North and South Vietnam were 
united into a communist led country. Preventing war in the Middle East was high among 
his objectives and by providing aid to both Israel and Egypt, the Ford Administration 
helped persuade the two countries to accept an interim truce agreement. Detente with the 
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Soviet Union continued and Ford and Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev set new 
limitations upon nuclear weapons” (WH Biography).   
 
Domestically, with little success, he presided over the worst economy in the four decades 
since the Great Depression, with growing inflation and a recession during his tenure 
(Frum, 2000: xxiii, 301). 
 
Ford’s was a short, troubled presidency.  His times were not good times to be in office.  
He was faced with the challenges of rising inflation, a depressed economy, chronic 
energy shortages, the final days of a very divisive war and through it all, the continuing 
cloud over his head of the Nixon administration malfeasances.  In the end he could not 
overcome those challenges, but it seemed that the people of America knew he was doing 
all possible.  Even with all his problems in office and a major challenge by Ronald 
Reagan in the Republican primaries, he lost the election by less than 1% of the vote and 
actually carried more states than the winner, Jimmy Carter.   
 
After Ford left the White House in 1977, he justified his pardon of Nixon by carrying in 
his wallet a portion of the text of Burdick v. United States, a U.S. Supreme Court 
decision which stated that a pardon indicated a presumption of guilt, and that acceptance 
of a pardon was tantamount to a confession of that guilt.  In 2001, the John F. Kennedy 
Library Foundation awarded the John F. Kennedy Profile in Courage Award to Ford for 
his pardon of Nixon and in presenting the award to Ford, Senator Ted Kennedy said that 
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he had initially been opposed to the pardon of Nixon, but later stated that history had 
proved Ford to have made the correct decision. 
 
Was he a great president?  No, and while he may have had a failed “presidency,” he was 
not a “failed president” as he has been called (Skowronek, 1993, 411).  Under the 
circumstances, he probably had little chance for success and at best was a caretaker 
president.  No one summed up his time in office better than his successor, Jimmy Carter, 
who on Inauguration Day began his speech: "For myself and for our Nation, I want to 
thank my predecessor for all he has done to heal our land" (White House Biographies).  
 
William H. Taft 
The case of William Howard Taft is, like Ford’s, most unique.  Whereas Ford entered 
office under the worst of circumstances, it would seem that Taft entered office under the 
most favorable circumstance possible.  In fact, “Only two or three times in American 
history has an incumbent President been able to pick his successor and get the nation to 
accept him.  Probably it can be said that Jefferson was responsible for Madison's being in 
the White House, Certainly Jackson named Van Buren as his heir and urged his 
acceptance.  But Theodore Roosevelt practically gave the country an ultimatum to take 
Taft or take himself for a third time, and the country without a whimper took Taft 
because "Teddy" told them to.  And, as always happens when a glamorous man is 
followed by an unglamorous one, Taft could not fill his predecessor's shoes; and this was 
construed by Theodore Roosevelt's followers, despite the accomplishments of the Taft 
Administration, as disloyalty to the Roosevelt program.  The newspapers, for whom 
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Roosevelt had supplied headlines almost every day of his Presidency, continued to 
feature the adventures of the dramatic man, so that the people, through their reading, also 
came to be somewhat disappointed in the Taft regime" (Armbruster, 1966: 255). 
 
In 1908, after having served as President for nearly two full terms, Theodore Roosevelt 
choose not to run again.  Roosevelt and Taft had had a long term personal and 
professional relationship with Taft having served in a number of key governmental 
positions, to include Secretary of War during Roosevelt’s administration.  With 
Roosevelt not running, he orchestrated Taft’s nomination.  His election against Bryan 
was virtually a foregone conclusion (Armbruster, 1966: 257) and Taft won with 52% of 
the popular vote.  
 
Although Taft had been strongly supported by Roosevelt and the progressive elements of 
the party, he tried to be his own man.  A lawyer by profession before he became so 
closely aligned with Roosevelt, his rise in politics initially came through Republican 
judiciary appointments, and then through service in a number of key governmental 
postings.  President McKinley sent him to the Philippines in 1900 as chief civil 
administrator and there he improved the economy, built roads and schools, and helped 
bring democracy, at least at some level, to the country.  However, it was clear early in his 
career that Taft much preferred law to politics. Appointed a federal judge at 34, he 
aspired to be a member of the Supreme Court.  However, Roosevelt had other plans for 
him.   
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Taft knew when he assumed office that his governing style, mannerisms and personality 
all differed from those of his predecessor. Unlike Roosevelt, Taft did not believe in the 
stretching of presidential powers. He once commented that Roosevelt "ought more often 
to have admitted the legal way of reaching the same ends" (WH Biographies).   Taft 
continued many of Roosevelt’s policies, but in some cases not as enthusiastically as his 
predecessor.  His agenda emphasized trust-busting, civil service reform, strengthening the 
Interstate Commerce Commission, improving the performance of the postal service and 
passage of the Sixteenth Amendment.  However, he alienated many liberal Republicans 
by defending the Payne-Aldrich Act which continued high tariff rates. A trade agreement 
with Canada, which Taft pushed through Congress, would have pleased eastern advocates 
of a low tariff, but the Canadians rejected it. He further antagonized Progressives by 
supporting his Secretary of the Interior, who they accused of failing to carry out 
Roosevelt's conservation policies (WH Biographies). 
 
In the angry Progressive onslaught against him, he was given little credit for having 
initiated 80 antitrust suits and that during his administration Congress submitted 
amendments for a Federal income tax and the direct election of Senators. A postal 
savings system was established, and the Interstate Commerce Commission was directed 
to set railroad rates (WH Biographies).  
 
Taft's foreign policy agenda, known as “Dollar Diplomacy” often involved the use of 
military actions in support of diplomacy as a means of promoting U.S. business interests 
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overseas. For instance, Taft sent Marines to Nicaragua in 1912 to help stop a rebellion 
against the government primarily because it was friendly to American business interests. 
 
Taft was faced with many issues that were not under his control.  His situation was very 
similar to the one John Adams had with Hamilton.  Theodore Roosevelt was not able to 
cut the ties to the office and allow Taft be his own man.  Roosevelt’s continued 
involvement and presence on the political scene caused considerable problems and 
divided loyalties among their joint followers.  Roosevelt further compounded the 
situation by publically stating he would not run but then having second thoughts.   Not 
able, or wanting to separate himself from his followers, through them he continually 
challenged the president’s every action.  Even with this, Taft may well have overcome 
these issues and been reelected; however, Roosevelt took steps to run for president at the 
end of Taft’s first term, and when he was unable to secure the Republican nomination, he 
formed the Bull Moose Party.  This action completely splintered the Republican Party 
and led to Woodrow Wilson’s election.    
 
Taft’s post presidential years were good and satisfying.  Returning to his first love, the 
law, he became a law professor at Yale and in 1921 he got his long desired wish to 
become a member of the Supreme Court when Warren Harding nominated him to be the 
Chief Justice, a position he served in until a month prior to his death in 1930.  
Were Taft’s times bad?  Probably not as bad as those of John Adams and John Q. Adams; 
however, he suffered many of the same issues.  While his administration is not noted for 
significant achievements, he suffered no major setbacks and he may well have been 
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reelected without the internal infighting and splintering of his party.  He, like John 
Adams, was most adversely affected by the forces that should have been his most strident 
supporters.   
 
Jimmy Carter 
In 1976 James Earl (Jimmy) Carter ran for president on a platform focused on restoring 
trust in government after the debacle of Watergate.  Basing much of his campaign around 
Ford's pardon of Nixon, he faced off against a serving president who was having 
difficulties with issues such as high inflation, high energy costs and recession.  While this 
would seem to be the perfect scenario, the vote was close with Carter winning barely 
50% of the popular vote and 297 out of 538 electoral votes. 
 
According to his White House biography, he aspired to make government "competent 
and compassionate," and responsive to the American people and their expectations. His 
achievements were notable, but in an era of rising energy costs, mounting inflation, and 
continuing tensions, it was impossible for his administration to meet these high 
expectations (WH Biographies).  
 
However, “although inheriting a number of significant issues from his predecessor’s 
administration, Carter entered with significant support and the opportunity to make 
significant positive change; however, he was not successful and he is generally 
considered a failed president” (Skowronek, 1993: 411).   
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Carter started his administration with a somewhat controversial action that caused angst 
both on the left and right.  Whereas his predecessor had offered clemency in return for 
service to draft dodgers, Carter, on his first day in office, issued a pardon for all those who 
dodged the draft in the Vietnam War era. However, he did not pardon deserters. 
During his administration, he worked hard to combat the continuing economic woes of 
inflation and unemployment and by the end of his term he could claim an increase of 
nearly eight million jobs and a decrease in the budget deficit, as measured in percentage 
of the gross national product. Unfortunately, inflation and interest rates were still at near 
record highs, and efforts to reduce them caused a recession (WH Biography).  
 
He did have a number of limited successes in domestic affairs. He dealt with the energy 
shortage by establishing a national energy policy and by decontrolling domestic 
petroleum prices to stimulate production. He promoted government efficiency through 
civil service reform and proceeded with deregulation of the trucking and airline 
industries. He sought to improve the environment. His expansion of the national park 
system included protection of 103 million acres of Alaskan lands. In the area of human 
and social services, he created the Department of Education, bolstered the Social Security 
system, and appointed record numbers of women, blacks, and Hispanics to government 
jobs (WH Biography).  
 
However, in foreign affairs, Carter for the most part was not successful.  His 
championing of human rights was coldly received by the Soviet Union and some other 
nations. He had some success in the Middle East through the Camp David agreement of 
1978, which helped bring good will between Egypt and Israel and he obtained ratification 
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of the Panama Canal treaties.  Building on the work of predecessors, he established full 
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China and completed negotiation of 
the SALT II nuclear limitation treaty with the Soviet Union (WH Biography).   
 
However, he will long be remembered for his setbacks in foreign policy.  The Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan caused the suspension of plans for ratification of the SALT II 
pact and led to a boycott by the U.S. of the 1980 Olympics.  While he was able to 
formally establish diplomatic relations between China and the U.S, the dynamics of 
foreign policy for the United States dramatically changed on November 4, 1979, when 
the U.S. embassy in Teheran, Iran was seized and 60 Americans were taken hostage. In 
retaliation for the 52 U.S. hostages who were subsequently held for more than a year, 
Carter suspended oil imports from Iran.  With the UN Security Council calling for the 
release of the hostages, Carter initially imposed economic sanctions with little success 
and then authorized U.S. troops to conduct a covert rescue mission to rescue the hostages. 
The attempt ended with the loss of U.S. lives and was not successful.  While the 
Ayatollah Khomeini eventually agreed to release the hostages in exchange for release of 
Iranian assets in the U.S., they were not released until after Carter left office and Reagan 
had been sworn in as President.  This gave the strong message that the Iranians felt they 
could outwait Carter, but were concerned with the potential response and actions Reagan 
might take.  The hostage crisis furthered the perception of weak leadership on Carter’s 
part and along with his domestic issues led to a most unsuccessful four years in office.     
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Carter left the presidency in 1981 and like William Howard Taft, was extremely 
successful after his time as President.  Many believe he has been our most successful ex-
president.  He became an important figure in Habitat for Humanity and been involved in 
diplomatic endeavors and missions throughout the world.  Many feel his time in office 
was a stepping-stone for great things and political commentators have at times referred to 
Carter's post-White House period as his "second term." Widely applauded for his globe-
trotting efforts, in 2002 he became the first former President to win the Nobel Peace 
Prize.  However, his time in office and his administration suffered from his inexperience 
in politics, his micro-management and his frequent backing down during confrontations.  
At times he appeared indecisive and ineffective and to not be able to clearly articulate his 
priorities.  His disdain for the Washington DC political environment was clear and he 
seemed to be distrustful and uninterested in working with other groups, or even with 
Congress when it was controlled by his own party.   
 
In the 1980 campaign his opponent, Ronald Reagan, projected an easy-going self-
confidence, in contrast to Carter's serious and introspective temperament. Reagan used 
the economic problems, Iran hostage crisis, and lack of Washington cooperation to 
portray Carter as a weak and ineffectual leader which led to him becoming the first 
elected president since Hoover in 1932 to lose a reelection bid. 
 
Acknowledging Carter inherited a number of significant issues from his predecessor’s 
administration, he was not able to overcome them and as more situations arose, especially 
with international ramifications, he did not exhibit the leadership or abilities to resolve 
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them.  His time in office was difficult time for the entire country, leading to a dramatic 
shift in the political alignment of the country.  It led to the presidency of Ronald Reagan 
and the ushering in of a completely new philosophy of the use of presidential power. Like 
some of the other presidents this paper has discussed, Carter found himself among group 
of presidents “generally judged as politically incompetent” (Skowronek, 1993: 8). 
 
So, where did they stand in their time as President?  While it is safe to say that all 
presidents have challenges during their time in office, these six presidents had truly 
difficult presidencies.  Adams, Taft, Bush and Carter faced virtual uprisings from within 
their own parties.  John Q. Adams was a president, who although before his presidency 
had great prestige and a superb reputation, lost much of his credibility because of the taint 
of how he secured the presidency.  Ford appeared to have significant personal credibility 
and prestige however, he lost much of both when he pardoned Nixon.  Carter was a 
virtual unknown who brought little personal baggage with him when he became 
president.  Because he was so unknown, he had to establish his personal reputation and 
credibility, but seemed overwhelmed by the issues and was not able to establish either.  It 
appears that to a degree all became victims to their times, and both John and John Q. 
Adams, as well as Carter have all been called “politically incompetent” and Ford and 
Carter both called failed presidents (Skowronek, 1993; 411, 8).   
 
Even with their issues, Bush and Taft seem to have accomplished the most during their 
time in office and have been the most successful.  While Taft saw in-fighting within his 
party, his administration, for the most part was successful.  Bush’s difficulties with the 
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economy were noted earlier, however, he will be best remembered for his position on the 
world stage as leader of the coalition he led during the liberation of Kuwait from the 
forces of Saddam Hussein. 
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Chapter Three  
Greatness Among One-Term Presidents 
“Presidential Time” 
 
Have we exhausted ways to look at these presidents?  No, because a number of 
significant studies exist that provide us with additional ways to look at our presidents. 
 
If one is to review the current dialog in presidential leadership literature, it appears to be 
a successful president, one needs to be a good “clerk”, but also have the power to 
persuade; or needs to be an able “facilitator”; or, simply be lucky based on the timing of 
his presidency.  This portion of the thesis will review how these presidents used their 
presidential powers and leadership skills and analyze them in accordance with the 
principles outlined in a number of significant presidential leadership studies.  While 
many common threads run throughout these resources, three stand out due to the 
precedents they established in changing the way we look at presidential leadership and 
the use of presidential power. They are: “Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents,” 
by  Richard E. Neustadt; “The Strategic President, Persuasion & Opportunity in 
Presidential Leadership,” by George Edwards, and; “The Politics President Make, 
Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton,” by Stephen Skowronek.  As such, theirs 
will be the primary resources used to further analyze our sample population.   
 
Richard Neustadt’s book, “Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents,” changed the 
landscape on how scholars viewed presidential power and leadership, arguing that 
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“Presidential power is the power to persuade” (Nuestadt, 1960: 11).  In differentiating 
presidents before Franklin Roosevelt and those subsequent, he noted that presidents now 
are expected to do far more than their authorities prescribe and for the last 65+ year’s 
scholars, students, and presidents have viewed presidential leadership through this prism.  
With the initial publication of his book in 1960, Nuestadt reoriented the study of the 
presidency from those of Edward Corwin (Corwin, 1957), who focused on the formal 
constitution based powers of the presidency and Clinton Rossiter who stressed the 
president’s formal roles (Rossiter, 1960).   Neustadt made the case that the president’s 
power is based on personal power rather than formal authority of the position.   
 
Nuestadt viewed leadership and “presidential power” from a strategic view and looked 
beyond a president simply trying to get a bill through Congress or settling strikes, and in 
doing so scrutinized the ability to influence and answer questions such as: What is its 
nature of the individual’s influence and what are its sources of power? What can this man 
accomplish to improve the prospect that he will have influence when he wants it?  
Strategically, the question being not how one masters Congress in a particular instance, 
but what he does to boost his chance for mastery in any instance, looking toward the 
future (Nuestadt, 1990: 4)?  Nuestadt hypothesized that modern Presidents face demands 
from five distinguishable sources: from the executive officialdom, from Congress, from 
his supporters, from citizens at large and from abroad.  He further argued that while the 
President derives his powers from his constitutional authority, he is actually relatively 
weak and little more than a “clerk” who is not able to affect significant change without 
the approval of congress, and that there are no guarantees that other members of the 
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government, to include members of his administration, will help him achieve his goals 
(Nuestadt, 1990: 8). In arguing such, he focused on three key traits the President must 
possess to succeed in the White House.    
 
Nuestadt saw the “power to persuade” as the most significant aspect of presidential 
power and that in executing it presidents convince others that what he wants is in their 
best interest acknowledging that just because he wants something done, does not mean 
that others will carry out his desires (Nuestadt, 1990: 29-49).  This is because “the 
president's advantages are checked by the advantages of others. Continuing relationships 
will pull in both directions.  These are relationships of mutual dependence. The president 
depends upon persons whom he would persuade; he has to reckon with his need or fear of 
them” (Neustadt, 1990: 31).  In his continuing dialog and negotiations, the President must 
emphasize to his colleagues how his policies will benefit them as well. 
 
The second aspect of Presidential Power is the President’s “professional reputation.”  The 
President’s reputation in large part comes from how successful others feel he will be in 
carrying out his agenda and legislation (Nuestadt, 1990: 50-72).  Basically, does he have 
the resources and executive branch support to do what he promises?  The group with 
whom the president’s professional reputation is most important is the “Washingtonians." 
While not necessarily located in Washington they are the “elites,” individuals such as 
governors, politicians, foreign ambassadors, and the congress. Reputation comes into 
play by how capable the government's infrastructure is, and how the president is 
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perceived in his ability to carry out his agenda and legislative actions.  The better the 
reputation of the president the easier it is to facilitate negotiations to implement policies. 
 
The third aspect of presidential power is related to his “public prestige” and how the 
public views the president (Nuestadt, 1990: 73-89).  While the public has little direct 
association with policy making, their view of the president affects how legislation is 
enacted.  Public prestige is also seen in the private sector. If private organizations look 
highly upon the president, it's easier to execute his policies.  A good opinion on the 
constituency’s part will help the president's policies move through Congress.  
 
Public prestige and professional reputation as outlined by Nuestadt, have much in 
common. The public's view affects the reputation, and the reputation affects the public 
opinion of the president and without these and the capabilities to capitalize on them, the 
president will fail. He further indicated that a president must think and act proactively so 
the decisions he makes today will aid in his abilities to persuade tomorrow. Nuestadt said, 
“The presidency is not a place for amateurs. The sort of expertise can hardly be acquired 
without deep experience in political office. The presidency is a place for men of politics 
but by no means is it a place for every politician” (Nuestadt, 1960:152). 
 
In reading Nuestadt, one obvious shortfall, or possibly a bias becomes obvious.  “The 
centerpiece of Nuestadt’s analysis was his description of a new political/institutional 
system that had taken shape in the late 1940s and early 1950s, basically his is a portrait of 
“the presidency at mid-century” one that identified incumbents after Franklin Roosevelt 
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as a distinct and coherent group facing similar challenges in political action (Nuestadt, 
1960: 5), but differing from their predecessors.  He argues that in this period central 
direction and control of national affairs had become for the first time a routine 
imperative, and therefore modern presidents have to be leaders as opposed to being mere 
clerks fulfilling the constitutional responsibilities of the office.   
 
This characterization by Nuestadt is somewhat condescending and his “periodization of 
presidential history – his distinction between modern and premodern contexts for the 
exercise of power -- introduced a sense of coherence into the relentless succession of 
incumbents and raised the study of leadership efforts above the idiosyncrasies of the case 
at hand.  But simple periodization schemes impose severe limits on the analysis of 
leadership, and Nuestadt’s was no exception …. The notion of a prior age when 
presidents did not have to be leaders -- an age when vital national interests were only 
sporadically at the fore and most presidents could rest content with mere clerkship – is 
nothing more than a conceit of modern times. The question of just how different the 
politics of leadership in modern times is or whether the mid-twentieth-century 
individually share more with one another than they do with president in earlier periods is 
never greatly explored” (Skowronek, 1993: 4-5). 
 
Due to this omission, or bias, three of our sample population (John Adams, John Q. 
Adams and William Howard Taft) are not mentioned in Nuestadt’s text, because he 
focuses entirely on the “modern president,” as if earlier presidents did not deal with 
similar issues.  
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His discussion of George H.W. Bush is done to simply support his premise that the office 
and responsibilities of the President have dramatically changed over the last 200+ years 
and will continue to do so.  “Since FDR in wartime, every president including Bush has 
found the role of superpower sovereign beguiling: personal responsibility at once direct 
and high … But the distinctions lessen -- compare Bush's time with Nixon's to say 
nothing of Eisenhower's -- and we should expect they will lessen further” (Nuestadt, 
1990: 317-318).  Nuestadt passed away in 2003; depriving political scientists the 
opportunity to hear more of his thoughts on Bush’s and subsequent administrations.   His 
thoughts would have been most interesting in that Bush appeared to have the attributes 
Nuestadt called for and entered office with the one of the finest sets of credentials and 
experiences of any of our presidents, along with an outstanding reputation and 
considerable proven abilities in working behind the scenes.   
His discussion of Gerald Ford is much more detailed and acknowledges, due to the 
circumstances under which Ford entered office and the shortness of his term, his time in 
office was most unique in American history.  Although coming into office under the most 
adverse of conditions, Ford had a superb reputation and was held in high esteem upon 
entering office by the general population.  Additionally, although he had been Nixon’s 
vice president, he was not tainted by the corruption within the White House.  His 
professional reputation was intact and he had served honorably in Congress for over 25 
years, had risen to the position of House Minority Leader, and may well have eventually 
been the Speaker of the House had he remained in Congress.  Additionally, he did well 
coming into office and bringing in a team that knew government and with whom he felt 
comfortable.  In fact, Ford's White House is notable for having in it more political 
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associates with government experience who knew him when their status matched his 
own, or nearly so, than any president since Franklin Delano Roosevelt (Nuestadt, 1990:  
228).  
 
However, the favorable atmosphere he enjoyed soon changed.  “Succeeding a disgraced 
man, but not himself legitimized by a popular election, Ford needed to assure the 
continuity of office by his demonstrated differences from his predecessor.  That he 
managed to convey for just a month then blurred it when he pardoned Nixon, who had 
not yet even been indicted (Nuestadt, 1990:  295).  “Ford’s reputation slumped, his 
prestige was already falling, and the media bore down on him as scornfully as four years 
afterward on Carter” (Nuestadt, 1990:  295).   
 
From Nuestadt’s perspective, Ford basically did himself in.  While generally seen as a 
well-intentioned man, he was faced with a number of severe challenges such as inflation, 
high unemployment and reestablishing the government’s credibility after Watergate.  
However, Ford’s presidential prestige and ability to use his powers to credibly lead and 
persuade which would have strengthened his case for presidential greatness, were mooted 
by the terms of his accession, his initial actions in office and inability to use his powers in 
carrying out his agenda.   
 
Jimmy Carter's transition to the presidency started him off on the wrong foot and then the 
situation worsened.  As discussed earlier, Carter had a number of significant 
shortcomings in his leadership and management style.  He promised that his 
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administration would maintain higher standards than his predecessors.  However, during 
his administration he lived up to none of those images “and was lambasted in the press 
for his shortcomings.  Comments describing the state of affairs during his first year for 
the most part were damning and indicated, “I have never heard so many suggestions of 
ineptness about a new Administration,” from a Democratic senators staff member, and 
“The president decides even the petty questions himself. He attends to minute details to 
an obsessive degree.”  At the end of his second year, the comments were no more 
positive, “[He falls short] in commanding the attention of the American people” 
(Nuestadt, 1990: 233-234).  
 
Possibly too much was expected of President Carter, “a relatively unknown with a 
plurality of 0.04 percent of the popular vote is not the combination of which mandates are 
made” (Nuestadt, 1990: 234).  He suffered from the consequences of being an outsider 
and wanting to continue to be one.  A lackluster campaign, a low vote, was followed by a 
tepid national reaction to his person and his programs (Nuestadt, 1990; 239).  
 
And the situation simply got worse.  Carter did not seem to exhibit any of the three traits 
that Nuestadt found so important.  He did not have a national public following and 
therefore the public prestige needed to be able to push his agenda.  Nor did he have the 
professional reputation that would have led to a level of credibility with the 
Washingtonians and shown them he could carry out his agenda.  Seen as a weak leader in 
almost every area and virtually overwhelmed by the issues confronting his 
administration, he clearly did not have the power to persuade.     
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Based on Nuestadt’s comments and an analysis of the administrations of the presidents he 
did not address, outlined below is how successful the sample population was in exhibiting 
Nuestadt’s three key traits while in office:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Traits 
  Power to Persuade Professional Reputation       Public Prestige 
J. Adams   No   Yes          Yes* 
Bush   Yes**   Yes   Yes 
J.Q. Adams  No   Yes***            Yes 
Ford   No   No****             No**** 
Taft   Yes*****  Yes   Yes 
Carter   No   No   No 
 
* Considerable prestige with the public; however, it was greatly diminished during his term.   
** Significant successes in garnering support for action such as Desert Shield/Desert Storm and 
most of his agenda; however, difficulties in getting full support for economic legislation.   
*** However, severely tarnished by the circumstance that brought him into office 
**** The pardon did irreparable damaged both his professional reputation and public prestige 
***** Had the ability, but was somewhat stifled by the actions of his predecessor, Theodore 
Roosevelt, and his followers.    
 
In his book, “The Strategic President,” George Edwards took a somewhat different 
approach than Neustadt, with the premise that presidents best achieve change when they 
exploit existing opportunities rather than attempt to persuade others to change or alter 
their preferences or behavior.  He argues presidents don’t lead, rather they pursue and 
advance agendas that already have some level of support.  He disputes Neustadt’s 
premise that presidential power is “the power to persuade” and argues that the president 
must engender change by other means.  For Edwards, it’s not whether a president 
matters, it’s “how” they matter.  Namely, how do they bring about change?  He argues 
even the most skilled and effective president does not create new opportunities by 
persuading others to follow their lead (Edwards, 2009: 6).  In his analysis of Abraham 
Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan, Edwards goes against the 
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consensus view and argues that none of the three, was truly able to employ persuasive 
rhetoric and go over the head of Congress to change the political terrain.  Rather, he 
argues presidents cannot really move public opinion because the population’s policy 
preferences are stable over time and competing arguments drown out the President’s 
message. Rather, they must work around the edges.   
 
Edwards maintains presidential leadership is most effective when presidents are 
“facilitators” who recognize opportunities, prioritize them, and, convince a small number 
of undecided actors to support particular goals. Arguing that change is not inevitable, and 
facilitators make things happen that otherwise would not, he argues they are skilled 
leaders who must recognize the opportunities that exist in their environments, choose 
which opportunities to pursue, when and in what order, and exploit them with skill, 
energy, perseverance, and will (Edwards, 2009:12).  
 
Edwards, like Nuestadt, did not address all presidents in his book.  Neither of the Adams’ 
were mentioned, and in the case of Taft, the only reference made was in relation to Bush 
when he said, “Bush became only the fifth sitting president this century to be defeated 
(other defeated incumbents were William Howard Taft, Herbert Hoover, Gerald Ford and 
Jimmy Carter)” (Edwards, 2009; 163).  (Of note in the previous century there were also 
five as well as an additional five who failed to be renominated – authors note.). 
 
While Edwards acknowledges Bush had significant roadblocks placed in front of him as 
he attempted to move his agenda, he also noted that Bush possessed the traits he indicated 
64 
 
were needed to be an effective president.  Given Edwards’ focus on leadership so 
intensely tied to the powers of coordination and facilitation, and the need to articulate 
agendas and issues, it is regrettable that when asked about his biggest disappointment as 
President George H.W. Bush replied, “I just wasn't a good enough communicator” 
(Edwards, 2009; 21).    However, he did have talents, and Edwards commented, 
"Observers often commented that George W. Bush lacked Reagan's charisma, but was a 
Washington insider with highly developed interpersonal skills" (Edwards, 2009; 45).  
“George Bush lacked rhetorical skill and he knew it. He was uncomfortable in the “bully 
pulpit” but also believed that public saber rattling was counterproductive..... He went 
public as much as his predecessors but he was more comfortable building consensus one-
on-one behind closed doors” (Edwards, 2009: 157). 
 
“When Bush took the oath of office on January 20th 1989 he was already fighting an 
uphill battle.  He began his tenure with one of the worst for strategic positions of any 
newly elected president in American history.  New presidents traditionally claim a 
mandate from the people, because the most effective means of setting the terms of debate 
and overcoming is the perception of an electoral mandate, an impression that the voters 
want to see the winner’s programs implemented.  George H.W. Bush was not so 
fortunate. The conditions of his electoral victory undermined any claim that the White 
House could make as to having received a mandate. The new president’s popular vote 
percentage was a respectable but unimpressive 53%, and his party lost seats in both 
houses of Congress. He actually ran behind the winners in 379 of the 435 congressional 
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districts. Thus there was little basis for members of Congress inferring presidential 
coattails” (Edwards, 2009: 154). 
 
An important leadership resource for a president is “the strength of his party in Congress. 
President Bush took office facing the largest opposition majority in Congress of any 
newly elected president in American history – Democratic advantages of 10 seats in the 
Senate and eighty-five seats in the house.  The budget deficit also tightly restricted his 
ability to take policy initiatives, because there was very little in the way of slack 
resources with which to take them” (Edwards, 2009: 155).  
 
“Following conservative icon Ronald Reagan would have been difficult for any president, 
especially a Republican one.  Moreover, the conditions in which Reagan’s successor 
George H.W. Bush found himself were not felicitous.  Yet the President had success and 
dealt with a number of major and contentious issues. Thus the George H.W. Bush 
presidency it is instructive in increasing our understanding of how presidents may make 
the most out of circumstances in which they serve and that are beyond their power to 
change” (Edwards, 2009 153).  
 
Bush did have the power to persuade and facilitate.  His successes in foreign policy and 
his status as a wartime president and coalition leader of Operation Desert Storm are a 
large part of George H.W. Bush’s legacy.  They were “only possible because of the 
coalition assembled by George Bush – one unparalleled in world history and one that 
would not have supported the direct overthrow of Saddam Hussein” (Edwards, 2009 159 
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– 160).  While usually recognized for the first gulf war, Edwards noted other numerous 
other successes in using his facilitation skills.  
 
Edwards indicates that Bush was somewhat limited making dramatic changes because he 
had inherited so many problems from Reagan.  In fact, “In general the presidency of 
George H.W. Bush was devoted to consolidating the changes of the Reagan 
administration and dealing with the problems it left behind rather than mobilizing a 
coalition behind new enterprises. It was a term of prudent stewardship, but not one that 
was oriented towards laying the groundwork for significant changes in domestic policy. 
While opinions change over time, it is interesting to note, the only time Bush and his 
predecessor, Reagan were “compared” in one of the Schlesinger presidential surveys was 
in 1996, when Bush actually placed higher (24th versus Reagan’s 25th ranking out of 39 
presidents) (Schlesinger; 1997).   
 
The president is dependent on his environment in creating favorable strategic positions 
from which he can exercise leadership at the margins.  Given his strategic position, 
George Bush had fewer opportunities to exploit than did most presidents. Understanding 
the weaknesses of his situation, and not able to persuade the Democrats in Congress to 
vote for conservative legislation, he made progress on a number of fronts by pursuing 
moderate policies and negotiating compromises with the Democratic majority. Ultimately 
however he could not overcome the weakness of his strategic position and responded to 
the context in which he served by turning to foreign policy where his inclinations and 
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expertise gave him greater flexibility and more opportunity to leave his mark on history” 
(Edwards, 2009 166).  
 
Edwards has little to say concerning Ford, besides that he either lacked a vision for the 
future or failed to effectively articulate one and this led to stewardship of competence 
without a compass and detracted from his ability to build a strong image to lead the 
American people and Congress (Edwards, 2009; 157).  However, while giving Ford the 
benefit of the doubt, this situation, in part was exacerbated by the circumstances behind 
how he came to office and his missteps during his first few weeks in office.   
 
Carter had little success in articulating his agenda and working with people, especially 
those he needed most in Congress to move his agenda forward.  While every president 
faces unique challenges, Carter seemed to have suffered from an overabundance of them, 
many of which were self-inflicted or came from within his own party.  Like Ford, “Carter 
had the misfortune to preside during a period of substantial inflation and unemployment 
whereas stable prices sustained economic growth and general prosperity characterized 
Kennedy and Johnson’s tenure” (Edwards, 2009: 134-135).   Additionally, “the constant 
opposition he faced from the vocal and powerful liberal wing of his own party 
undermined Carter's ability to promote his policies. His press secretary, Jody Powell 
reported that a survey of the press found that 75% of the critical commentary on the 
administration in 1977 came from Democrats, mostly liberals. In 1980 the President had 
to deal with the challenge of Senator Edward Kennedy for the Democratic nomination” 
(Edwards, 2009: 134-135).  
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Carter had considerable problems in pursuing his agenda and garnering support on the 
Hill.  Edwards states “the White House is often its own greatest competitor” and was not 
able to focus the nation on his agenda.  It is well documented how his staff did not help 
him through good coordination with an adversarial congress.  Because they did little 
coordination with the Hill they had great difficulties in simply getting his actions on 
Congress’ agenda” (Edwards, 2009: 100).  
 
While his democratic predecessor, Lyndon Baines Johnson, had been very successful in 
dealing with Congress based on personal prestige and reputation, Carter failed miserably.  
However, to help put this situation in perspective, perhaps the most obvious difference 
between democratic administrations of the 1960's and Jimmy Carter's in the late 1970’s 
was that Carter was disadvantaged by serving during a period of congressional 
assertiveness that followed Vietnam and Watergate.  
 
Similar to Ford he did not have a vision. Or if he did, he failed in his ability to articulate 
it (Edwards, 2009; 157).  Nuestadt probably put it best when he said, “The presidency is 
not a place for amateurs. The sort of expertise can hardly be acquired without deep 
experience in political office. The presidency is a place for men of politics but by no 
means is it a place for every politician” (Nuestadt, 1960:152). 
 
Based on Edwards’ comments and an analysis of the administrations of the presidents he 
did not address in his book, the chart below outlines how successful the sample 
population were in exhibiting Edwards’ key traits while in office:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
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Trait   Facilitation Skills  Ability to Exploit Opportunities  
J. Adams    No*     No*   
Bush    Yes    Yes** 
J.Q. Adams   No    No*** 
Ford    No    No 
Taft    Yes    Yes**** 
Carter    No    No  
 
*Inability to exhibit either due to dissention within his own party 
** Overall successful; however, some difficulties with pursuing his solution to budget issues 
*** Dissention with powerful opposition  
**** Was overall successful in exploiting many of the opportunities with his agenda; however, 
his lack of complete support for his predecessor’s agenda led to internal party dissention. 
 
The leadership traits and usages of power outlined by Neustadt and Edwards come from 
their perspective of looking back at and reviewing how presidents performed in order to 
recommend how future Presidents should possible act.   In his book “The Politics 
Presidents Make, Leadership from John Adams to Bill Clinton,” which won the Richard 
E. Nuestadt Prize for Presidential Research, Stephen Skowronek’s thoughts runs counter 
to both Nuestadt and Edwards.  Although looking at presidents and their administrations 
retrospectively, he provides a very sophisticated view and a predictive model.  Whereas 
Nuestadt, and to a lesser degree Edwards, argue the president is weak and either must use 
his power to “persuade” or “facilitate” to make his agenda successful, Skowronek 
believes the President has enormous power and the challenge is in his authority.  His 
book, “offers an analysis of leadership patterns that are repeatedly produced through the 
American constitution system by the peculiar structure and operation of its presidential 
office.  In this sense, it is about the politics that the American presidency makes” 
(Skowronek, 1993: xvi).  Further, his central argument is that, “assuming the presidential 
office and exercising its power has an inherent disruptive political effect, and that the 
presidential leadership is a struggle to that effect in the reproduction of a legitimate 
political order“(Skowronek, 1993: xii).  This “legitimate political order” is key, in that 
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the true measure of power for a president is what is the basis, namely the warrant 
(license), that legitimize his actions?  That “legitimacy” is key, because without that 
legitimacy, his supporters become discouraged and his enemies emboldened. While this 
initially appears to be somewhat in synch with Nuestadt’s discussion of Presidential 
reputation and prestige, he disputes Nuestadt (Skowronek, 1993, 5), and argues the most 
important factors in the president’s efforts and his chances for success are predicated on 
where he stands in “political time,” which in large part is based on the successes or 
failures of his predecessor(s).  He sees presidents as classified in two dimensions: 
 Their affiliation with, or opposition to, a given “regime” 
 The extent to which that order is either vulnerable or resistant. 
The president’s success is predicated in large part, by where the president and the 
predecessor he is most closely aligned to stand in the following political cycle: 
 Reconstruction:  Presidents who were fortunate enough to follow a weak or 
vulnerable regime (i.e., Roosevelt after Hoover, or Reagan after Carter) and were 
able to establish a new order.  This group is made up of the great regime builders 
who overthrew the vulnerable previous regimes – Thomas Jefferson, Andrew 
Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Delano Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan.  
(Skowronek, 1993: 36-37).  None of our candidates fall into this category. 
   
 Disjunction:  The period where a long standing political order is collapsing and no 
longer capable addressing the challenges facing the country.  They are caught 
between the actions they need to take and those their supporters oppose.  Examples 
of presidents in this category include John Adams, John Q. Adams, Herbert Hoover, 
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Franklin Pierce and Jimmie Carter.  Skowronek argues their issues were less their 
capabilities and limitations but rather that they governed in impossible times and 
could not satisfy the demands of their supporters (Skowronek, 1993: 39-40).  
 
 Articulation:  These are affiliated with the new order from Reconstruction; however, 
are faced with different challenges.  They are expected to follow the vision of their 
predecessor, while at the same time there appears to be differing opinions as to what 
that vision actually entails.  Their decisions ultimately split their support base which 
still holds loyalties to the initial reconstructive President.  They are seen as in two 
groups. Those that immediately follow in the coalition founder and are seen as 
unable to stand in their predecessor’s footsteps (i.e., Martin Van Buren, William 
Howard Taft, Harry S. Truman, and George H.W. Bush) and those that later attempt 
to renew the founder’s vision (James Polk, Theodore Roosevelt, Lyndon Baines 
Johnson and George W. Bush).  They quite often become one-term presidents 
(Skowronek, 1993: 41-42). (Underlining is this author’s.)   
 
 Pre-Emption:  While one party is dominant, occasionally the other party comes into 
office (i.e., Andrew Johnson, Cleveland, Wilson, Eisenhower, Nixon, Clinton, and 
Obama) and you end up with an opposition leader in a resilient regime.  Presidents in 
this category generally distance themselves from the previous failed order; however, 
they generally have extremely adversarial relationships with the powers of the 
previous regimes (Skowronek, 1993: 43-44). The book mentions this situation, but 
does not discuss it in detail.  None of our candidates fall into this category.   
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Five of our six presidents fall into the two categories Skowronek indicates are most likely to lead 
to unsuccessful presidencies: 
Reconstruction  Disjunction*   Articulation**   Pre-Emption Caretaker*** 
John Adams           X 
George H.W. Bush                           X 
John Q. Adams           X     
Gerald Ford                            X  
William H. Taft                                 X   
Jimmy Carter            X   
 
*Their issues were less their capabilities and limitations, but rather that they governed in 
impossible times and could not satisfy the demands of their supporters. 
**They immediately follow the coalition founder and are seen as unable to stand in their 
predecessor’s footsteps and generally become one-term Presidents.    
***Not  a category identified by Skowronek; however Ford’s circumstances of coming into office 
and his limited time in office do not offer the opportunity to clearly place him in one of the other 
categories.   
 
Skoronek’s model is unique and stresses not necessarily leadership traits, but where the 
President stands in time and his political affiliation, and that are the best indicators of 
their potential for success.   From a historical perspective this model is very interesting 
and in retrospect, predictive.  In outlining the philosophical difficulties presidents face 
with when in either the Disjuntion or Articulation categories, it is clear that all six of our 
candidates entered office with powerful negative dynamics they had to overcome and did 
so with varying levels of success. 
 
All six had problematic presidencies. Their problems were not necessarily in their 
leadership style.  In some cases it was internal party dissention or inherited issues such as 
troubled economic times.  In other cases appears to have just simply been their personal 
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leadership style, and yet in still other cases it appears they virtually had no chance to be 
successful due to circumstances beyond their control.  
 
The chart below indicates how successful our six presidents were in exhibiting the traits 
identified for presidential success by Nuestadt and Edwards and if their “Presidential 
Time” fit Skowronek’s model.   
   Nuestadt  Edwards      Skrowronek 
J. Adams      No         No    Yes  
Bush       Yes         Yes   Yes 
J.Q. Adams      No         No    Yes 
Ford       No         No    Yes* 
Taft       Yes          Yes   Yes 
Carter       No         No    Yes 
 
*Although mentioned by Skowronek, comments were minimal and only to clarify 
another’s situation. 
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Greatness Among One Term Presidents 
Conclusion(s) 
 
Measuring presidential success and their ability to lead is not a simple process and leaves 
much to the researcher’s discretion.  The situation is compounded by the multitude of 
opinions and the expectations we have put on the 43 who have occupied what is arguably 
the most critical position in the world.  Analyzing our sample population in light of the 
varied situations they faced while in office, and how they met, or failed to measure up to 
the criteria established in current theories on what attributes the presidents need to be 
successful and how the public and scholars have viewed their performance has presented 
a number of interesting challenges – none of which could not be overcome.   
 
All faced significant challenges.  Some from strong opposition parties, some from 
internal factions, some from both.  Some faced issues with the circumstances that led 
them into office, and others had unique situations as they left office.  All met their 
challenges in different ways and with varying levels of success.    In the research for this 
project a number have been called fail presidents, or worse. However, it is clear they 
were all well-intentioned, dedicated and did the best possible under often adverse 
conditions. 
 
Attempts have been made to ensure the criteria used in this research has been as holistic 
and unbiased as possible.  The criteria used to measure them has been threefold:  1) How 
the public and experts in the political science and history fields have viewed their time in 
75 
 
office; 2) An analysis from a strictly historical perspective on how they handled the major 
situations that arose during their administrations, and; 3) An analysis of their leadership 
styles and how they used their presidential powers.   
 
In reviewing our six candidates for the greatest one-term president if one simply goes by 
the numbers, it would be John Adams followed very closely by George H.W. Walker 
Bush and then followed at some distance by John Quincy Adams, Gerald Ford, William 
Howard Taft and Jimmy Carter. 
 
If the researcher follows the Arthur Schlesinger model and looks for events that gave the 
candidates the opportunity to be "lucky in their times" and be identified with some crucial 
point in our history, the nod could possibly go to either Adams for keeping the United 
States out of war with France or George H.W. Bush for his success in leading the 
coalition against Saddam Hussein during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, or to Gerald 
Ford for his actions, although controversial, in resolving the Nixon situation after the 
Watergate crisis.  Here the nod goes to Bush.  His crisis was real and he led a major 
coalition on the world stage.  In the case of Adams, his actions are like trying to prove a 
negative.  However, it is a given, that the United States did not go to war but, it is none 
the less difficult to subjectively or objectively measure his success.  In the case of Ford, 
he inherited a number of tremendously difficult issues and a times had significant 
problems while in office, but he was none the less aggressive in his actions to reconcile 
the country and right the economy.  He acted courageously in pardoning Nixon, and will 
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forever be remembered for that action; however, that action was tremendously unpopular 
and exacerbated a number of other significant issues he had during his unsuccessful term. 
In reviewing the candidates based on current presidential leadership philosophies, 
especially through Skowronek’s lens, it is clear all came into office under relatively 
adverse conditions.  While not necessarily pre-determining their ultimate successes, they 
were all at a disadvantage upon entering office.  
 
Against Edward’s and Nuestadt’s models, the majority of the sample population had 
difficulties, caused by either their own personality quirks or internal party infighting or 
severe attacks from strong opposition leaders. Bush and Taft come out somewhat better 
than the others, with Bush getting the nod based on his persuasive powers in forming the 
coalition for Desert Shield/Desert Storm and on his abilities lead and facilitate.  Edwards 
noted that while not as strong a communicator as his predecessor, he was able to function 
quite often behind the scenes and take advantage of his Washington insider credentials. 
Faced with a major disadvantage in the opposition majority in the House and the Senate 
for the most part he did well in pushing his agenda through. Edwards specifically 
comments that Bush's presidency was instructive in increasing the understanding of how 
presidents can make the most out of circumstances which are beyond their control to 
change. In the other cases, the others were not as successful.   
 
While the research question to be specifically answered was not whether George H.W. 
Bush was the greatest one-term president, this analysis suggests, he was.  However, it 
also adds to the body of work in two other areas.  It shows how presidents either reacted, 
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or didn’t react to adverse conditions and provides a number of lessons future presidents 
should avoid, at the risk of becoming a one-term president.  Among them are: 
 All the men involved in this study were politicians, yet they did not all understand 
the political landscape, nor be flexible enough to prepare for change.  John Adams 
was the last Federalist president. All the historical pieces indicate the country was 
anxious for change, and he yet he did not move from the position of his predecessor 
until it was too late politically.  His situation was not helped by having an opponent 
as his vice president, but he also exacerbated the situation by retaining his 
predecessor’s cabinet remain in place. 
 Better prepare for your presidency.  Carter had three months to prepare.  However, 
he came across as unprepared and so anti-Washington, that he was not able to gain 
the credibility he needed as an unknown coming to Washington.  Bill Clinton also 
stumbled when he first took office over issues such a health care; however, his 
transformation should be used and an example of how a president can overcome 
early obstacles.  Ford, regretfully, had no time to prepare for his time in office.   
 In following a most successful president, such as Washington, Theodore Roosevelt 
or Reagan into office you must early on differentiate yourself from your predecessor, 
or embrace the principles he stood for.  Adams could have championed change, and 
Taft paid dearly for not aligning himself with Roosevelt aggressively enough. 
 Any behavior that appears to be underhanded or unethical will affect your entire time 
in office.  John Quincy Adams paid dearly for Henry Clay’s support.  This advice is 
even more relevant in today’s political environment with 24 hour news coverage, etc.  
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Conspiracy theories continue into Ford’s alleged complicity in the Nixon pardon 
continue today.   
 Leave room for compromise.  The inability, or lack of desire to seek compromise can 
poison an administration.  John Adams showed little flexibility in his adherence to 
Federalist policies until late in his term, even though the country was already moving 
in that direction.  His son, had little opportunity to compromise due to the 
circumstances in which he came in to office.  Carter came in as an outsider and did 
not want to work within the systems and paid the price.  Although possibly beyond 
his control, Ford lost the opportunity to compromise early on during his 
administration, and ended up not being able to pursue his agenda and subsequently 
vetoed far more legislation (66) than any of the other president in our sample 
population (John Adams (0), John Quincy Adams (0) Taft (39), Carter (31), and 
George H.W. Bush (44)), although his time in office was by far the shortest.    
 Although possibly counter intuitive, presidents do have to take positions above the 
fray, and simply “do the right thing.”  While he was surprised at the extent of the 
public outcry, I believe Gerald Ford in his heart did the right thing in pardoning 
Richard Nixon.  Bush faced a similar fate as Ford, when he reneged on his pledge of 
“No new taxes.”  When making these stands, be strategic in thought, method and be 
prepared for the consequences, be they positive or negative  
 
Before completing this research, it should be noted, that while the author feels strongly 
his research is solid and his findings defensible, he acknowledges that continued research 
should be done, and based on the changing dynamics of leadership thought and politics 
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in general, a different author could come up with different findings in the future.  New 
areas of thought are being developed.  For instance, while both Nuestadt and Edwards 
have espoused philosophies that presidents should use their political powers to persuade 
and work issues with the powers that be within the boundaries of the past, many in the 
political science arena are viewing this situation from far more radical views based on 
the current political environment, as well as a relook of the past.  
 
For instance, while Skowronek touches on it slightly, recent political actions seem to 
more strongly focus on the executive and legislative branches attempting to circumvent 
rather than cooperate with the other branch.  In many cases it appears that rather than 
utilize the policies and practices that have been formally in place for decades, they now 
oft time go for a preemptive strike approach which sees less coordination and bargaining 
and more public posturing than before.  This view goes against the grain and the time 
honored traditions of bargain and “horse-trading.”  Samuel Kernell further notes that 
presidents go public not simply to impress the general populace but to enhance the 
administration's position with Washington elites. Mobilizing public opinion is a way of 
influencing other Washingtonians who are also dependent upon public support for their 
positions (Kernell: 1986). While Kernell initially outlined this approach nearly 30 years 
ago, it clearly contradicts Edwards and to some extent Nuestadt, but it offers insights 
into the current national political environment.  Continuation of this type of “politics” in 
the future may cause dramatic changes in the skills presidents need in the future.    
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Taking this approach a radical step further, William Howell, in his thought provoking 
book, “Power Without Persuasion: The Politics of Direct Presidential Action,” discounts 
the generally positive leadership theories and actions reinforced and articulated by 
Nuestadt and Edwards and outlines an aggressive style of presidential leadership that is 
based on the “propensity of presidents, especially during times of crisis, to unilaterally 
impose their will on the American public” (Howell, 2005).  In doing so, he somewhat 
revises the commonly held view of history and argues that rather than persuading or 
coordinating, presidents routinely set public policies over the objections of Congress, 
interest groups, and the bureaucracy.  Citing instances throughout U.S. history, from the 
Louisiana Purchase to the Emancipation Proclamation and beyond, he outlines cases 
where presidents have by-passed Congress and in some cases the American people to set 
policies of their own. In just the last 65+ years, the period Nuestadt focusses on in his 
book and refers to as the modern presidency, Roosevelt interned Japanese Americans, 
Kennedy established the Peace Corps, Johnson got affirmative action underway, Reagan 
greatly expanded the president's powers of regulatory review, and Clinton extended 
protections to millions of acres of public lands all though executive, not legislative 
actions (Howell, 2005).  Howell further goes into great detail describing the executive 
actions taken by George W. Bush, post-September 11, in creating a new cabinet post and 
in the construction of a parallel judicial systems to apprehend, hold and try suspected 
terrorists, all done behind closed doors in the Executive Branch.  And, further supporting 
Howell’s thesis, these practices are clearly on-going today as President Obama 
implements executive orders to push his agenda rather than go through the difficult 
process of dealing with a legislative branch with the opposition in majority.   
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Howell’s research goes well beyond the theoretical scope of previous studies and rather 
than focus on a president’s skill, reputation, and ability to persuade and negotiate he 
contends that presidents can “effect policy change outside of a bargaining framework” 
(Howell, 2005: 13). He contends that Presidents have unilateral powers that go beyond 
persuasion and negotiation with Congress and that they can, and have exerted direct 
power on policymaking processes, and are able to limit the legislative and judicial 
bodies’ ability to check and intervene.  He examines the conditions under which 
presidents can expedite their agenda and change policy without congressional or judicial 
consent and then outlines a model of presidential power that forces substantive 
consensus through legislative branch through the threat of the veto, the use of executive 
orders vice legislative actions, and through the use of National Security Directives.     
 
Additionally, in an approach that has yet to have gained much traction to date, but yet 
merits consideration, Ethan Fishman has taken a very philosophical approach to the 
study of the presidents and taken the political science community to task on how they 
look at our presidents.  He specifically takes on Nuestadt and Edwards in describing how 
they go to great lengths to explain the causes and effects of presidential behavior, but do 
little provide normative judgment of that behavior. They rate the president's as good if 
they are energetic or persuasive and successful in passing legislation but really question 
whether the decisions president make or the policies they pursue are moral or laudable or 
"virtuous"  as opposed to the normal leadership criteria used in the behavioral science 
world.  He delves more frequently into the philosophical and looks at leadership 
categories such as prudence, pragmatism, idealism, and cynicism (Fishman, 2001). 
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This paper has gone to great lengths in evaluating the one-term presidents based solely 
on their time in office and not their other accomplishments either before or after taking 
the presidency, and hopefully has been somewhat successful in doing so.  However, this 
appears to be an area worthy of study, and one that is beginning to get increased 
visibility.  Winger and Jain, in an article currently under review for publication, have 
shown that the presidents most likely to engage in ambitious post-presidencies were 
those who either resigned or failed to win re-election and of the ten presidents they 
initially identify as having the most international affairs involvement post-presidency, 
eight left office either through their inability to secure their party’s nomination, a failed 
campaign, or resignation (in the case of Richard Nixon)  (Winger and Jain, unpublished).  
Interesting that this population virtually mirrors the one we have been discussing.   
 
In a recent New York Times article, Justin Vaughn discusses common threads he found 
among those he considers to be great ex-presidents.  He identifies that in many cases our 
greatest ex-presidents have engaged in important post-presidency work, sometimes at a 
level that rivaled their accomplishments in the White House. On the down side he also 
identifies that our worst ex-presidents have been noteworthy for taking strong positions 
against the national interest and consistently undermining their successors for personal 
and political reasons.  Based on his opinions and research he determined the four greatest 
ex-presidents were John Quincy Adams, Jimmy Carter, William Howard Taft, and 
Herbert Hoover and that John Tyler, Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, and Teddy 
Roosevelt were our country's worst ex-presidents (Vaughn, 2015).  Interesting that seven 
of those eight were one-term presidents. 
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Without question, there is considerably room for further research in this area and with 
this population.  Hopefully, this research has laid a good groundwork for future efforts.  
While others could potentially come to different conclusions, or use different criteria to 
measure success, based on the criteria that Americans, “want a president in the White 
House who can get the job done,” it appears James Baker was correct, when he declared, 
“George Bush was the best one-term President in the history of the United States.”   
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